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Law
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ABSTRACT

This Article examines recent attempts to improve internationalstan-

dards governing the rights of indigenous peoples. In this context, Ms.
Lawrey analyzes the Australian Government's 1988 commitment to negotiate a treaty with Australia's Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
peoples.
Ms. Lawrey discusses the strained relationship between international
law and indigenous peoples. At present, indigenous groups are not guaranteed special rights under internationallaw. Furthermore, traditional
individual rights are inadequate to effectively protect indigenous land
rights and the right to self-determination. Ms. Lawrey identifies developments in indigenous rights since World War II, including International
Labor Organization Convention Number 107 (Convention 107) and the
United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations. Despite
these advances, Ms. Lawrey indicates Convention 107 is of little practical value and thatfor the United Nations Working Group to succeed, it
must effectively address the issues of land rights and self-determination
and must recognize the importance of treaties to indigenous peoples.
Ms. Lawrey also discusses the contemporary relevance of treaties, high*

Australian National University (B.A. (Hons.), 1973; M. INT. L., 1990). The Au-

thor is an officer of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. However,
this Article was written entirely in her private capacity, and in no way reflects the views
of that Department or of the Australian Government.
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lighting the recurringconflicts between indigenous peoples and their national governments. In addition, Ms. Lawrey questions the practical
value of treaties as guaranteesof indigenous rights, as states are free to
modify or terminate such treaties on a unilateral basis.
Under this framework, Ms. Lawrey examines the Australian Aboriginal Treaty proposal against the background of the settled colony doctrine
in Australia and its implicationsfor Aboriginal rights. Aborigines have
called for a solemn and binding negotiated treaty. Although the Australian Government publicly has committed itself to negotiate such an agreement, there are political difficulties to overcome before this commitment
can be fulfilled.
Ms. Lawrey concludes that a worthwhile Universal Declarationon indigenous rights must deal with the sensitive issue of indigenous self-determination in a way that is acceptable both to indigenous groups and national governments. She further concludes that for any domestic
agreement on indigenous rights to be effective, it must include a credible
guarantee that it will not be subject to unilateralmodification or termination by future governments. Ms. Lawrey indicates that possible alternatives to this requirement include mandatory international oversight,
international dispute settlement fora, independent conciliation, and
other methods of guaranteeingthe binding characterof treaties or agreements with indigenous peoples.
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INTRODUCTION

The Australian Government has announced its intention to negotiate a
treaty with Australia's Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples at
a time when efforts to devise international standards on indigenous
rights are underway. The International Labor Organization (ILO) revised its Convention Number 107 (Convention 107) on Tribal and Indigenous Populations, and the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UN Working Group) is developing a Draft
Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights (Draft Declaration) and
embarking on a study of treaties with indigenous peoples. The Australian treaty proposal will be of.considerable interest to individuals and
groups concerned with indigenous rights in general, and to the UN
Working Group in particular. The timing of this exercise provides Australia with an opportunity to make a positive contribution to the development of new approaches on indigenous rights. The successful conclusion
of such an agreement would serve as a useful precedent in itself and
could include innovative provisions that other countries might incorporate in existing or future agreements with their indigenous peoples.
This Article examines Aboriginal treaty concepts in the context of current international developments on indigenous rights and suggests how
these concepts might contribute to the development of international standards for such rights. The Article first will address the relationship be-
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tween indigenous rights and international law, the prospects for new international standards on the subject, and the difficulties confronting the
UN Working Group. These difficulties include the issue of self-determination and addressing the importance that indigenous peoples attach to
treaties. Section III discusses the contemporary relevance of treaties with
indigenous peoples, both in terms of their symbolic value as evidence for
the recognition of indigenous sovereignty or nationhood, and their practical value as guarantees of indigenous rights. Section IV analyzes the Aboriginal treaty proposal against the background of the settled colony doctrine as applied in Australia, its unfortunate consequences for Aborigines
and Torres Strait Islanders, and the uncertain prospects for more helpful
judicial approaches in the future. Section V suggests possible approaches
to the questions of indigenous self-determination, monitoring government
commitments on indigenous rights, and guaranteeing the binding character of treaties or agreements with indigenous groups.
II.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law developed as "a system of rules governing the conduct of inter-state relations," 1 and traditionally did not concern itself
with matters falling within the domestic jurisdiction of individual states,
such as the way states treated their own nationals and others living
within their borders.2 This distinction is becoming harder to sustain as
international law evolves to suit an increasingly complex and interdependent world. In particular, a state's treatment of its own nationals has
become a legitimate subject of international concern since World War II.
The proliferation of international conventions on human rights3 that
build on the principles delineated in the United Nations Charter4 and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' has resulted in a body of
international legal norms that addresses what usually is an area of domestic jurisdiction.
1. D. GREIG,

INTERNATIONAL LAW I (2d ed. 1976).
2. Id. at 398-99.
3. Today, there are approximately 70 international instruments dealing specifically
with human rights issues.
4. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. Article 1 includes, as one of the Organization's
fundamental purposes, "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion
. • Id.

5. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the UN General
Assembly on December 10, 1948 to serve as "a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations." (Preamble), reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 4 (1981).
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Individual rights comprise the majority of what are accepted today as
human rights.6 Even when dealing with rights that presuppose the existence of a group to exercise them, the language used in human rights
instruments tends to be individualistic.' One collective right is that of all
individuals to self-determination,' but its application outside the context
of decolonization remains highly problematic,9 with no accepted application to indigenous peoples.1
As a group, indigenous peoples have no special rights under current

6.

Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern InternationalLaw, in THE

OF PEOPLES

RIGHTS

1, 2 (J. Crawford ed. 1988).

7. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted by
the UN General Assembly on December 16, 1966, entered into force on January 3,
1976), provides that "[iun those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice

their own religion, or to use their own language." Reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 31, 48 (emphasis added).
8. Article I of the UN Charter refers to "the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples." The concept is developed in many UN resolutions and other
instruments, including article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 7, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, (adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 16, 1966, entered into force
on March 23, 1976), reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 5, at 13. Article 1 of both Conventions provides that "all peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development . . . . The States
Parties to the present Covenant . . . shall promote the realization of the right of selfdetermination, and shall respect that right . .. ."
The ICJ endorsed the right of self-determination in the context of decolonization in its
Namibia advisory opinion:
the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing
territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle
of self-determination applicable to all of them. . . . [T]he ultimate objective of the
sacred trust was the self-determination and independence of the peoples concerned.
In this domain. . . the corpus iuris gentium has been considerably enriched, and
this the Court may not ignore.
1971 I.C.J. 9, 31-32 (advisory opinion).
The ICJ quoted this passage with approval in its Western Sahara opinion, 1975
I.C.J. 6, 32 (advisory opinion), and left no doubt that the right to self-determination
applied to the inhabitants of the Western Sahara. Id. at 36.

9. See J.

CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

84-102

(1979).
10. Some commentators have argued that the right of an individual to self-determination should apply to indigenous people. See, e.g., Clinebell & Thomson, Sovereignty and
Self-Determination:The Rights of Native Americans UnderInternationalLaw, 27 BuFFALO L. REV. 669 (1978).
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international law. Individually, they have the rights available to all individuals and minorities. Many of these rights, such as the rights of nondiscrimination, 1 religious freedom, freedom to speak one's native language, and maintaining one's cultural traditions12 are relevant directly to
the situation of indigenous peoples. These general human rights, however, offer little help to indigenous peoples who consider land rights and
the right to make choices about their own future as crucial to their survival as distinct peoples.
The fairly vague concept of distinct indigenous rights "has its foundations in 16th and 17th century interpretations of international law, [and]
was incorporated and further developed in British colonial policy and
has had its fullest expression in the case law of the United States." 1 The
degree to which indigenous rights are acknowledged, denied, ignored, or
deliberately extinguished in particular states always has been determined
by the individual state as a matter of domestic jurisdiction. Accordingly,
there is a dearth of customary international legal norms on the rights of
indigenous peoples and only one international convention, which is of
limited application, that deals with the subject. 4
A.

Theoretical Background: The Acquisition of Inhabited Territory

Writers on the subject of indigenous rights usually begin with the
Spanish theologian Vitoria and the age of discovery. 5 In 1532, Vitoria
dismissed the notion that, as uncivilized heathens, the natives of South
America were not the true owners of their land before the arrival of the
11. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 21, 1965, entered
into force on Jan. 4, 1969). In article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the states parties "undertake to guarantee that the rights
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind
." See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
.
8, art. 2.
12. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7, art. 27.
Strictly speaking, this is a negative right: "[P]ersons . . .shall not be denied the right
.• ." Id.

13. NATIVE RIGHTS IN CANADA 14 (P. Cumming & N. Mickenberg 2d ed. 1972).
14. ILO Convention No. 107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, 1957
[hereinafter ILO Convention or Convention 107]. The Convention has been ratified by
only 27 countries. See infra note 68.
15. Davies, Aspects of Aboriginal Rights in InternationalLaw, in ABORIGINAL
PEOPLES AND THE LAW: INDIAN, METIS AND INurr RIGHTS IN CANADA 16, 20-23 (B.
Morse ed. 1985) ("Vitoria" also is spelled "Victoria"); Sanders, The Re-Emergence of
Indigenous Questions in InternationalLaw, 1983 CAN. HUM. RTS. YB. 3, 4-5.
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Spaniards.16 Accordingly, Vitoria rejected discovery as the basis of Spanish title to the Indies.17 Vitoria also rejected claims that the Emperor was
entitled to seize the lands of the Indians, and that the Pope was entitled
to bestow sovereignty over them on Spain. He did not consider that either the Indians' refusal to accept Christianity or their sins justified the
Spanish conquest of South America, and dismissed claims that the Indians had chosen to accept Spanish rule.' 8
Discovery 9 or effective occupation z0 of new territory could have conferred legal title to territory only if the lands in question were terra
nullius.2 ' This did not mean that the territory was uninhabited, but

16. F. DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECIONES 127-28 (1964) (J.
Bate trans. 1917).
17. Vitoria wrote:
[T]he barbarians were true owners, both from the public and from the private
standpoint. Now the rule of the law of nations is that what belongs to nobody is
granted to the first occupant . . . .And so, as the object in question was not
without an owner, it does not fall under the title we are discussing .... [Discovery] in and by itself. . . gives no support to a seizure of the aborigines any more
than if it had been they who had discovered us.
Id. at 139.
18. Id. at 130-48. Although Vitoria clearly was uncomfortable about the moral and
legal validity of Spain's conquest of South America, he conceded that if the Indians denied Spain the right to trade or to preach the Gospel in their lands, Spain might seize
their lands as a last resort. Id. at 152-58. He added that other possible titles might be
based on the need to rescue the Indians from the tyranny of their rulers or from tyrannical laws, on a genuine voluntary choice by the Indians, or on alliances with some Indians
against others in a lawful war, but he was doubtful about a Spanish right to rule on the
grounds that the Indians were unfit to govern themselves according to civilized standards.
Id. at 159-61.
19. "Discovery" involves a symbolic taking of possession, not "mere visual apprehension." 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 408 (2d ed. 1970); M. LINDLEY, THE
ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

131-32 (1926).
20. O'Connell explained the difference between discovery and effective occupation as
follows:
The realities of territorial expansion in the past three centuries were such that
only actual settlement and administration, coupled with at least the presumption to
exclude others by force if necessary, invited the sanction of the law. Hence was
born the notion of effectiveness of occupation. It stood in opposition to the notion
of discovery, and so constituted a change in legal doctrine.
1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 19, at 409 (footnote omitted).
21. "Equally shameless is it to claim for oneself by right of discovery what is held by
another, even though the occupant may be wicked, may hold wrong views about God, or
may be dull of wit. For discovery applies to those things which belong to no one." 2 H.
GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIs LIBRI TREs 550 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925). In its
Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara,the ICJ noted, "it was a cardinal condition of
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rather that it belonged to no sovereign. 22 In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Popes and princes evidently were happy to allocate or
appropriate lands that did not belong to a Christian sovereign. 23 In practical terms, however, European authorities ultimately drew a distinction
between societies with some degree of political organization-and therefore capable of exercising sovereignty-and those lacking such organization. 2 As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) noted in its Advisory
25 "Whatever differences of opinion
Opinion on the Western Sahara:
there may have been among jurists, the State practice of the relevant
period [i.e., the period beginning in 1884] indicates that territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political organization
were not regarded as terra nullius." 6 The Western Sahara decision
indicates that the degree of social organization necessary to preclude acquisition of territory through occupation of terra nullius did not approach Western standards of the time. Justice Gros went even further in
his separate declaration on the Western Sahara: "I consider that the
independent' tribes travelling over the territory, or stopping in certain
places, exercised a de facto authority which was sufficiently recognized
'2
for there to have been no terra nullius. 7
Vitoria's conclusions that "the barbarians" were true owners and that
their lands, therefore, were not available for appropriation by right of
discovery, are regarded as the starting point for the theory of indigenous
rights. 28 Indeed, in a separate opinion on the Western Sahara, Justice

a valid 'occupation' that the territory should be terra nullius-a territory belonging to
" 1975 I.C.J. 12,
no-one-at the time of the act alleged to constitute the 'occupation' ....
39 (Advisory Opinion).
a tract of country were inhabited only by isolated individuals who were not
22. "[I]f
united for political action, so that there was no sovereignty in exercise there, such a tract
would be territoriumnullius." M. LINDLEY, supra note 19, at 23.
23. For a survey of practice in this regard, see id. at 24-25.
24. Id. at 20-23; see also I D. O'CONNELL, supra note 19, at 409.
25. 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion).
26. Id. at 39. None of the separate opinions disagree with the main judgment on this
particular point. Furthermore, that the nomadic tribesmen inhabited the Western Sahara
did not, in the Court's view, render it terra nullius:

[Tihe information furnished to the Court shows that at the time of colonization
Western Sahara was inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and
politically organized in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them. It also
shows that, in colonizing Western Sahara, Spain did not proceed on the basis that
it was establishing its sovereignty over terra nullius ....

Id.
27.
28.

Id. at 75.
Davies, supra note 15, at 20-33; see also Sanders, supra note 15, at 4-5.
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Ammoun argued for a return to Vitoria's rejection of the idea that inhabited lands could be treated as terra nullius.2 9
Vitoria was the first in a long line of commentators denying that inhabited lands could be acquired by occupation as opposed to conquest or
cession.3" These commentators included Grotius, who used Vitoria's arguments both generally 3 and to reject Portugal's pretensions to the East
Indies, 2 and Blackstone, who restricted occupation to desert or uncultivated lands.3 3 Vattel asserted that European nations needing more land
could lawfully take lands "which the savages have no special need of and
are making no present and continuous use of," 4 because nomadic tribes
were not entitled to "more land than they have need of or can inhabit
and cultivate." 5
By the late ,nineteenth century, some theorists indicated a more restrictive view of indigenous rights.36 In terms of actual state practice over the

29. Justice Ammoun reasoned:
In short, the concept of terra nullius, employed at all periods, to the brink of the
twentieth century, to justify conquest and colonization, stands condemned. It is
well known that in the sixteenth century Francisco de Vitoria protested against the
application to the American Indians, in order to deprive them of their lands, of the
concept of res nullius.
The approach adopted by the eminent Spanish jurist and canonist, which was
adopted by Vattel in the nineteenth century, was hardly echoed at all at the Berlin
Conference of 1885. It is however the concept which should be adopted to-day.
1975 I.O.J. at 87.
30. M. LINDLEY, supra note 19, at 12-17.
31. 2 H. GROTIUS, supra note 21, at 550.

32. H.

GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

13, 16-18, 21 (R. Magoffin trans.

1916).
33. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *107-08. Blackstone regarded Britain's
American colonies as the products of conquest or cession. Id.
34.

3 E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL

LAW 85 (C. Fenwick trans. 1964).
35. Id.
36. Lindley's extensive survey of the relevant publicists concludes that:
[E]xtending over some three and a half centuries, there had been a persistent preponderance of juristic opinion in favour of the proposition that lands in the possession of any backward peoples who are politically organized ought not to be regarded as if they belonged to no one. But that, and especially in comparatively
modem times, a different doctrine has been contended for and has numbered
among its exponents some well-known authorities; a doctrine which denies that
International Law recognizes any rights in primitive peoples to the territory they
inhabit, and, in its most advanced form, demands that such peoples shall have
progressed so far in civilization as to have become recognized as members of the
Family of Nations before they can be allowed such rights.
M. LINDLEY, supra note 19, at 20; see also J. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 175.

712

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23.703

entire period of European expansion, however, lands inhabited by
"primitive peoples" only rarely were regarded as terra nullius.37
B.

The Question of Indigenous Sovereignty

The debate over the acquisition of inhabited land arose out of the colonizing states' interest in supporting their respective territorial claims
against each other-their primary objective being the exclusive right to
settle or otherwise exploit particular areas. Rationalizing their acquisition of territory against the indigenous inhabitants was a separate question that had more to do with methods of taking land away from the
indigenous inhabitants than with the right of European states to do so.
They usually resolved this issue pragmatically through the use of force,
treaty, or unilateral governmental action.3"
According to one source, "[t]he North American Indian nations which
entered into treaties with the European settler states from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries were obviously subjects of international
law, but their status as 'indigenous' nations or states had no international legal relevance." 9 Nevertheless, some Indian tribes were effectively treated as states during the early stages of European contact. °
37. M. LINDLEY, supra note 19, at 24-44. In fact, "only Australia and the South
Island of New Zealand were treated as falling within that category, apart from scattered
islands or totally uninhabited tracts," although some areas of North America were
neither conquered from their indigenous inhabitants nor ceded by them. J. CRAWFORD,
supra note 9, at 180 (footnotes omitted); see also infra text accompanying notes 237-39.
38. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Worcester v. Georgia, the principle of discovery as a basis for title
regulated the right given by discovery among the European discoverers; but could
not affect the rights of those already in possession, either as aboriginal occupants,
or as occupants by virtue of a discovery made before the memory of man. It gave
the exclusive right to purchase, but did not found that right on a denial of the
right of the possessor to sell.
The relation between the Europeans and the natives was determined in each
case by the particular government which asserted and could maintain this preemptive privilege in the particular place.
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832). This explains why the discussion of indigenous rights
had more to do with property rights than with their sovereignty in the fullest sense of the.
term,
39. Hannum, New Developments in Indigenous Rights, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 649, 652
(1988).
40. See, e.g., Barsh & Henderson, Aboriginal Rights, Treaty Rights, and Human
Rights: Indian Tribes and "Constitutional Renewal," 17 J. CAN. SruD. 55, 63-65
(1982) (discussion of early treaties concluded with Indian tribes on Canada's east coast);
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832).

GUARANTEEING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS
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41
European states did regard some non-European communities as states,
but arguing otherwise would have been difficult in the cases of China,
Japan, or Siam (Thailand). Others were recognized as states, although
not necessarily as members of the community of nations, by the power
that acquired them.4 2 In effect, such recognition served to validate the
natives' surrender of sovereignty over their territory. This philosophy of
recognition occurred during the nineteenth century colonization of Africa. Normal state practice at the time consisted of staking a claim to a
given area, as against other European states, by means of agreements

43
with the tribes who lived there.

Logically, cession presupposes native sovereignty in the fullest sense,
as one cannot cede something one does not possess.4 4 At least one colonizing power did recognize the sovereignty of some native chiefs. 45 The
international arena, however, never explicitly acknowledged this recognition of sovereignty. On the contrary, the Berlin Act, which set out the
minimum conditions for European occupation of new territory on the
African coasts, did not require consent of the native tribes.4 6 In Island of
Palmas,47 Arbitrator Huber started with the premise that indigenous
communities were not states.48 With colonial protectorates in mind, Huber did not regard treaties with indigenous peoples as constituting titles
in international law. Rather, he explained that the colonial power's sovereignty as against other states was based not on the treaty itself, which

41.

J.

CRAWFORD,

supra note 9, at 176-77. The examples cited are China, the Otto-

man Empire, Afghanistan, Japan, Korea, Thailand, the Maratha Empire in India, the

Kingdom of Swaziland, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Hawaii, Tonga, and probably Samoa. Id.

42. In 1839, the British authorities regarded New Zealand as a state, although not,
apparently, as a member of the community of nations. Secretary for War and Colonies

Dispatch, Aug. 1839. Parliamentary Papers, 1840, volume XXXIII (238) quoted in M.
LINDLEY, supra note 19, at 41.
43. M. LINDLEY, supra note 19, at 34.
44. Lindley has observed:
The Powers themselves, as we have seen, have in large numbers of cases accepted
sovereign rights from the chiefs, and based their titles upon such cessions, and,

unless one is prepared to argue that the maxim Nemo dat quod non habet has no
application to such a case, it must be admitted that the chiefs themselves possessed

those rights.
Id. at 44.
45. Great Britain recognized the sovereignty of King Lobengula over Matabeleland.
In re Southern Rhodesia, 1919 App. Cas. 211, 214.
46. J. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 178; see also M. LINDLEY, supra note 19, at

144.
47.
48.

Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928).
Id. at 858.
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was "a form of internal organisation of a colonial territory," but on its
"suzerainty over the native State." 4 Even Lindley, who argued that
agreements with the native authorities were necessary to the creation of
colonial protectorates, conceded that the establishment of an effective administration in the territory cured any defects in an agreement."
C.

Indigenous Rights and International Law

1. International Legal Personality
The views discussed above reflect late nineteenth century colonialist
attitudes that coincide with a positivist approach to international law and
a period when large areas of the African continent were regarded as
available for appropriation by European powers. However mistaken
these scholars' underlying assumptions were, they are reflected in contemporary international law, which denies legal personality to indigenous peoples. 51 Indigenous communities are not states, international organizations, or national liberation movements in the accepted sense.5 2
Indigenous communities also are not analogous to such special entities as
the Vatican or Taiwan and, therefore, do not match any of the accepted
categories of subjects of international law." As indigenous peoples are
not subjects of international law, they have no recourse to extra-national
avenues of redress other than appeals to world opinion or complaints to
the Human Rights Committee if their state has signed the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. For
example, North American Indians' repeated attempts to petition the
United Nations (UN) have been fruitless, because the UN is without
mandate to deal with private submissions. 4

49. Id.
50. M. LINDLEY, supra note 19, at 175-77. Lindley noted that if the cession agreement isinvalid, "the acquiring Power loses the legal protection which a valid Agreement
would have given it for a reasonable time between the making of the Agreement and the
establishment of an efficient administration over the territory." Id.
51. See, e.g., Cayuga Indians (Gr. Brit.) v. United States, 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
173 (1926); G. BENNETT, ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (1978);
Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In ParticularIndigenous Peoples), in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES 17, 18-19 (J. Crawford ed. 1988); Green, Aboriginal Peoples, International
Law and the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms, 61 CAN. B. REv. 339 (1983).
52. Arguably, the Palestine Liberation Organization has a degree of international
personality. D. GREIG, supra note 1, at 104-05.
53. See, e.g., id. at 92-119.
54.

Sanders, supra note 15, at 14.
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Aboriginal Title to Land

The concept of indigenous rights focuses on Aboriginal claims of original title to land, an idea derived from Vitoria and his successors. Aboriginal title has been recognized by courts in the United Kingdom,55 United
States,5" Canada,57 and, at a very early stage, New Zealand,5 8 but it
never has been acknowledged by the Australian judicial system.5" The
principle of recognizing Aboriginal title in the absence of specific statutory provisions is not a customary rule of international law, because it
clearly is based on a British colonial practice that has been maintained
by only two of the four former colonies where it was imposed. Even in
the United States and Canada, indigenous peoples are not guaranteed
security of tenure in their remaining lands, because the national government unilaterally can extinguish indigenous title and associated rights.6 0
3.

A Question of Survival

Indigenous peoples, therefore, are subject entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of their states of nationality. The only international legal
norms under which they can appeal are contained in general human
rights instruments or, if their state of nationality has ratified it, International Labor Organization Convention Number 107 (Convention 107 or
ILO Convention). 6 This situation is profoundly unsatisfactory. While
Latin America was under Spanish rule, for example, the most enlightened and humane domestic laws failed to prevent savage mistreatment of
the Indians.62 Government policies, especially those involving forced assimilation, can have disastrous consequences for indigenous peoples. The
United States experience with its allotment policy in the 1880s and its
termination policy of the 1950s is a sobering case study in the field of
55. See, e.g., Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker, 1900 N.Z.P.C.C. 371; In Re Southern Rhodesia, 1919 App. Cas. 211; Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria, 1921 App.
Cas. 399.
56. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R. Co., 314
U.S. 339 (1941).
57. See, e.g., Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, 34 D.L.R.3d 145
(1984); Guerin v. Regina, 13 D.L.R.4th 321 (1984).
58. Regina v. Symonds, 1847 N.Z.P.C.C. 387.
59. Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty Ltd., 17 F.L.R. 141 (1971).
60. See, e.g., Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, 34 D.L.R.3d 145
(1973).
61. See infra Part II.D.1.
62. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31
GEo. L.J. 1, 9-11 (1942).
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forced assimilation."3 Yet, forced integration-or at least terminating any
special status indigenous peoples have under domestic law-still is a recurring temptation for national governments. 4 Indigenous peoples can
combat such measures effectively only by mobilizing sufficient domestic
and international political pressure. 5
D.

InternationalAction

The formation and activities of international indigenous organizations,
such as the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP), the International Indian Treaty Council, and the Indian Law Resource Centre,
have generated greater international awareness of indigenous issues.
Since World War II, the substantial development of international human
rights law has produced a more favorable climate for international action
on indigenous rights. It increasingly is difficult for governments concerned about their human rights image to ignore blatantly the problems
of their indigenous peoples. 6 Indigenous groups finally are gaining attention in international fora, and the 1980s marked the beginning of an
unprecedented period of international activity on the question of indige-,
nous rights.

63. See, e.g., Mason, Canadian and United States Approaches to Indian Sovereignty, 21 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 422, 451-52, 454-55 (1983).
64. For example, Canada introduced proposals for a new Indian policy in 1969 that
would have terminated the special status of Indians in Canada. These proposals sought
rapid integration to end the "unequal treatment" of the past, and an end to Canada's
Indian treaties was foreshadowed at the same time. Id. at 431. In the late 1970s, Brazil
drafted a decree providing for the forced emancipation of its Indians and an end to the
protected status of their lands. A. Ramos, Indian Rights and Indian Policy in Brazil
Today, 1-4 (Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Glasgow, Occasional Paper No. 28 1979).
65. Political pressure has been applied by indigenous peoples before in both Canada
and Brazil. In Canada, extremely strong Indian opposition made the 1969 Canadian
proposals a major embarrassment to the government, which withdrew them. Sanders,
The Rights of the AboriginalPeoples of Canada, 61 CAN. B. REv. 314, 319-20 (1983).
Similarly, the Brazilian emancipation decree aroused such opposition that it was redrafted to provide for continuing protection of Indian lands, and in the end it was never
signed by the President. See A. Ramos, supra note 64, at 3-4.
66. States that claim no indigenous populations include the USSR, India, and China.
Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of InternationalLaw, 80 AM. J. INT'L
L. 369, 375 (1986). African countries were not covered in the Martinez Cobo Report
because of the lack of information. "[T]he data furnished to the Special Rapporteur in
reply to requests for information for the study either denied the existence of such populations or stated that all groups in those countries were indigenous, or both." Study of the
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, para. 20 [hereinafter Martinez Cobo Report].
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1. ILO Convention Number 107
Convention 107 is the only international instrument specifically dealing with rights for indigenous and tribal populations. Although the 1967
ILO Conference unanimously accepted Convention 107, which includes

a strong provision on indigenous land rights," only twenty-seven states
have ratified it."' The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have indigenous populations, but have not ratified Convention 107.
Although Convention 107 attempts to address indigenous rights issues,
its focus on the ultimate integration of indigenous peoples is now considered out of date.69 Convention 107's usefulness is limited further, because few states have ratified it. Additionally, within those few states, its
effectiveness as a guarantee of indigenous rights is questionable."0 These
weaknesses prompted one commentator to note that "Convention 107 has
1
been an embarrassment to the ILO."'
Following review7 2 and consultation with indigenous groups,7 3 the

67. Article 11 provides that "[t]he right of ownership, collective or individual, of the
members of the populations concerned over the lands which these populations traditionally occupy shall be recognized." ILO Convention, supra note 14, art. 11.
68. Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau,
Haiti, India, Iraq, Malawi, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal,
Syria, and Tunisia.
69. Barsh, Revision of ILO Convention No. 107, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 756, 756
(1987).
70. The Martinez Cobo Report on discrimination against indigenous populations
concluded that:
Convention 107 has not proved very effective in protecting and developing the
human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous populations in countries
which are parties to it, since today, more than 25 years after its adoption, there is
little difference between the countries which are and are not bound by it, and such
differences as exist are not always in favour of the States parties to it.
Martinez Cobo Report, supra note 66, para. 335. The Martinez Cobo Report originally
was issued in parts as U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/Adds.1-6 (1981); E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1982/2/Adds.1-7 (1982), and E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Adds.1-5 (1983). It has
since been reissued as U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 Adds.1-4 (1987). The Library
of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs in Canberra holds a copy of the original version,
which is the one cited in this Article.
For a survey of the Convention's implementation in Latin America, see Swepston, The
Indian in Latin America: Approaches to Administration, Integration, and Protection,

27

BUFFALO

L. REv. 715 (1978).

71. Berman, The InternationalLabour Organizationand Indigenous Peoples: Revision of ILO Convention No. 107 at the 75th Session of the International Labour
Conference, 1988, REv. INT'L COMMISSION JURISTS 48, 49 (1988).
72. Barsh, supra note 69, at 761.
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seventy-sixth session of the International Labour Conference accepted
the revised ILO Convention in 1989. Interestingly, in view of current
efforts by the UN Working Group to develop a Universal Declaration
on Indigenous Rights (Draft Declaration), 74 the revision, ILO Convention Number 169 (Convention 169), largely retains the comprehensive
focus of Convention 107.7'
Convention 169 does offer the prospect of binding international rules
on how ratifying states treat their indigenous inhabitants. The ILO itself
regards Convention 169 as an effort to raise the minimum standards for
governments' dealings with their indigenous peoples. 76 In fact, Norway,
the first state to ratify Convention 169, has stated that it did so for this
very purpose. 77 It is uncertain, however, whether a revision will attract
substantially more ratifications than did the original. " How a revision
will fit within the standard-setting efforts of the UN Working Group
also is not clear. 79 No matter how many governments ratify Convention
169, its value as a guarantee of indigenous rights is suspect if it is widely
opposed by indigenous peoples. There have been indications that this
may be the case. For example, at the seventh session of the UN Working

73. Id. at 762.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 90-94.
75. As one authority notes:
While the problems with Convention 107 are glaring, it is not entirely clear why
the ILO determined to resuscitate the instrument at this time. Since 1982, United
Nations human rights organs have been engaged in standard-setting on indigenous
rights with the active participation of indigenous peoples and NGOs. As a specialized agency with a limited and defined mandate relating to labour issues, the ILO
seems poorly positioned to concern itself with the fundamental indigenous rights
issues that have emerged in the U.N. process: self-determination, territorial integrity including resource rights, and cultural integrity.
Berman, supra note 71, at 49.
76. Statement by Mr. Lee Swepston, ILO, to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, July 31, 1989, at 3.
77. Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populationson its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub/1990/42, para.
47.
78. Only one country has ratified ILO Convention 169, and at least one other is
contemplating ratification. A second ratification would bring the Convention into force.
Id. paras. 46-67.
79. The ILO has kept the Working Group informed about the revision process, and
has presented Convention No. 169 as an exercise in setting minimum standards which
does not pre-empt the Working Group's standard-setting efforts. Statement by Mr. Lee
Sweptson, ILO, to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, July 31, 1989 at
2-3. However, there is always the risk that, once minimum standards are in place, taking
the process any further will be seen as less urgent.
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Group in August 1989, the indigenous preparatory meeting submitted a
resolution strongly condemning the revised ILO Convention, calling on
states not to ratify it, and demanding that its terms be disregarded in the
process of developing a Draft Declaration."0
Indigenous groups condemn the revised ILO Convention on the
grounds that it promotes tokenism and that the drafters did not adequately consult them.8" To support these claims, the groups focus on
several of the revised ILO Convention's articles. First, they cite article
1(3), which states that "[t]he use of the term 'peoples' in this Convention
shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights
which may attach to the term under international law," thus side-stepping the contentious issue of whether indigenous peoples are entitled to
self-determination.82 Second, they cite article 6, which only imposes an
obligation to consult indigenous peoples "with the objective of achieving
agreement or consent" on measures that would affect them directly,
rather than imposing a clear obligation to secure their consent before
proceeding with such measures.8 3 Third, the groups cite article 8(2),

80. Resolution of the Indigenous Peoples PreparatoryMeeting-Geneva Relating to
the InternationalLabour Organization'sConvention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 1989 [hereinafter Resolution of the Indigenous
Peoples]. The resolution:
1. Calls upon Indigenous Peoples all over the world to seize every opportunity to
condemn the ILO and the revision process.
2. Calls upon states not to ratify the revised Convention.
3. Calls upon Indigenous Peoples to monitor the ILO and governments in the
implementation of the Convention.
4. Calls upon support groups of Indigenous Peoples to urge states not to ratify the
Convention and to publish lists of governments who ratify the revised Convention.
5. Calls upon members of the Working Group and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities to condemn the racist
revision.
6. Calls upon the Working Group to monitor the implementation of the revised
Convention.
7. Calls upon governments and human rights experts involved in the process of
drafting the Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples not to repeat the mistake
of the ILO.
8. Calls upon the Working Group, the Sub-Commission and governments to disregard the terms of the revised Convention in the process of achieving a meaningful
development on the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
81. See Berman, supra note 71, at 51-42.
82. Statement by Sharon Venne to the 1989 ILO Plenary, extract from ILO Provisional Record No. 31, submitted to the seventh session of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations.
83. Id.
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which states that indigenous peoples have the right to keep their own
customs and institutions "where these are not incompatible with fundamental rights as defined by the national legal system," a proviso that
some read as "an invitation to further assimilative measures by governments." 84 Finally, the indigenous groups claim that the provisions concerning indigenous land and resource rights generally are inadequate.85
Nevertheless, indigenous opposition to Convention 169 is not uniform.
While some groups continued to criticize it at the ninth meeting of the
UN Working Group in August 1989, others supported it and endorsed
ratification by states with indigenous populations. 6
2.

The UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations

The involvement of the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Sub-Commission) in indigenous issues began as a spin-off from its work on racial discrimination
and minority rights. 7 The Sub-Commission established a Special Working Group in 1982 to review developments, especially in individual
rights affecting indigenous populations. While the Working Group's job

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The Report of the Working Group provided:
Several indigenous observers expressed disappointment with the revised ILO
Convention inasmuch as it did not fully and adequately respect indigenous demands. The Convention was challenged as paternalistic and oriented towards the
interests of Governments. It did not, it was said, sufficiently require Governments
to recognize indigenous rights to territory, land and resources and, furthermore, it
did not properly recognize the crucial requirements for indigenous consent. Other
indigenous representatives expressed support for the revised Convention and for
the efforts of the ILO to promote and protect indigenous rights. They endorsed
ratification by all States which have indigenous peoples within their borders and
felt that respect for the Convention's provisions would improve the situation of
indigenous peoples in most countries.

DiscriminationAgainst Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42, para. 47.
87. The Sub-Commission's 1969 study on racial discrimination included a chapter

on indigenous peoples. See Special Study on Racial Discriminationin the Political,Economic, Social and Cultural Spheres, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/307/Rev. 1 (1971).
Country reports under the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination also refer to the situation of indigenous peoples. See Hannum, supra note
39, at 658. The Sub-Commission's 1976 study on the rights of ethnic, religious, and
linguistic minorities suggested that discrimination against indigenous peoples warranted
special attention. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384, cited in Eide, United Nations Action
on the Rights of Indigenous Populations, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 21 (R. Thompson ed. 1987).
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is identifying issues rather than apportioning blame, it is well informed
on developments affecting indigenous peoples,88 and listens to indigenous
groups' criticisms of government policies.8 9 From the beginning, the
Working Group has proven itself as a uniquely accessible UN body by
accepting oral and written representations from any indigenous organizations, not just from those that have formal consultative status with the
Economic and Social Council.9" In addition, government observers actively participate in the Working Group's meetings. For some states, this
participation is an exercise in damage limitation, while other states, such
as the USSR, India, and China, participate even though they claim to
have no indigenous populations. 9 ' Nevertheless, the debate between government and indigenous observers that occurs at Working Group sessions is a positive development.
While the Working Group continues to review developments affecting
the rights of indigenous peoples, its main efforts now are focused on
developing a draft declaration on indigenous rights.92 At its sixth session
in August 1988, the Working Group discussed its Chairman's "Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights" draft. 93 The draft has since been
revised in light of the discussion and subsequent written comments by
interested parties. 94 During its eighth session the Working Group established three informal drafting groups to continue the "elaboration" of the
draft declaration on the basis of this first revised text." The next stage

88. See Eide, supra note 87, at 12.
89. See Hannum, supra note 39, at 661.
90. Id. at 660.
91. See Barsh, supra note 66, at 375.
92. See Hannum, supra note 39, at 661; Barsh, supra note 66, at 373.
93. The draft declaration is at Annex II of the same document. It covers the following main subjects:
Part I: The right to freedom, equality and non-discrimination;
Part II: The collective right to exist, to be free from genocide and ethnocide, and to
preserve their cultural identity;
Part III: Land rights and associated issues;
Part IV: The right to maintain their traditional lifestyle and means of subsistence;
assistance with economic and social development, reflecting their priorities; and
control of all social and economic programmes which affect them;
Part V: The right to full participation in the life of the state, and to control of
their own internal and local affairs;
Part VI: Dispute settlement mechanisms.
94. See FirstRevised Text of the Draft Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/33, 4-8 [hereinafter First Revised
Text].
95. DiscriminationAgainst Indigenous Populations:Report of the Working Group

on Indigenous Populations in its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42,
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will be to circulate the Working Group's report, "containing all proposals and discussions concerning the first revised text," to all interested
parties for written comments and suggestions. 6 A study on "treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements between states and indigenous populations" also is being undertaken for the Working
Group,97 which endorsed a draft outline prepared by the Special Rap98
porteur at its sixth session.

E. Indigenous Claims: Land, Treaties, and Self-Determination
Professor Nettheim identifies ten specific classes of indigenous claims:
"physical survival; cultural survival and cultural identity; sovereignty;
self-determination; self-government; land rights; control of land and its
resources; compensation; non-discrimination; and affirmative action. ' 99
Land, and the rights associated with land, are at the core of indigenous
claims. The Martinez Cobo study claims that "[i]t is essential to know
and unders*tand the deeply spiritual special relationship between indigenous peoples and their land as basic to their existence as such and to all
their beliefs, customs, traditions and culture."10 0 The study adds further
that "[t]he recognition and protection of land rights is the basis of all
indigenous movements and claims today in the face of continuous encroachment on their land."' '
The World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) submitted to the

para. 51. The reports of the three drafting groups are at Annexes III, IV, and V of the
Report. A summary of comments made in the drafting groups and in the plenary meetings is included in the report. Id. paras. 56-130.
96. Id. para. 54.
97. See First Revised Text, supra note 94, at 25-30.
98. DiscriminationAgainst Indigenous Populations-Reportof the Working Group
on Indigenous Populations on its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24,

Annex 1 [hereinafter Report on Indigenous Populations].
99. Nettheim, "Peoples" and "Populations"-IndigenousPeoples and the Rights
of Peoples, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 107, 116 (J. Crawford ed. 1988). Similarly, the
second assembly of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) identified 14 "irrevocable and inborn rights which are due to us in our capacity as Aboriginals," including: self-determination; the right to maintain their culture, language and traditions; the
right to recover land that has been taken from them; inalienable, collective land ownership; the right to administer and use their land and resources; government funding; respect for indigenous culture; and education in accordance with their culture and tradi-

tions. Special General Assembly of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples:
Declarations and Resolutions, reproduced in Martinez Cobo Report, supra note 66,
reissued in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/87.
100. Martinez Cobo Report, supra note 66, para. 196.
101. Id. para. 215.
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Working Group's fifth session a draft declaration of principles which
provided that:
Indigenous people shall have exclusive rights to their traditional lands
and its resources, where the lands and resources of the indigenous peoples
have been taken away without their free and informed consent such lands

and resources shall be returned.
The land rights of an indigenous people include surface and subsurface
rights, full rights to interior and coastal waters and rights to adequate and
exclusive coastal economic zones within the limits of international law.
No action or course of conduct may be undertaken which, directly or
indirectly, may result in the destruction of land, air, water, sea ice, wildlife, habitat or natural resources without the free and informed consent of
the indigenous peoples affected.' °2
Similarly, indigenous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) submitted
to the same session a draft declaration which asserted that:
Indigenous nations and peoples are entitled to the permanent control and
enjoyment of their aboriginal ancestral-historical territories. This includes
surface and subsurface rights, inland and coastal waters, renewable and
non-renewable resources, and the economies based on these resources.
Discovery, conquest, settlement on a theory of terra nullius and unilateral legislation are never legitimate bases for States to claim or retain the
territories of indigenous nations or peoples.
In cases where lands taken in violation of these principles have already
been settled, the indigenous nation or people concerned is entitled to immediate restitution, including compensation for the loss of use, without
extinction of original title. Indigenous peoples' desires to regain possession
and control of sacred sites must always be respected.' 03
National governments must realize that indigenous peoples would not
accept a declaration on indigenous rights that failed to include a strong
statement on land rights. Whether these governments are prepared to
consider full restitution and compensation for land taken from indige-

nous peoples, however, remains to be seen. Major difficulties likely will
102. Declaration of Principles Adopted at the Fourth General Assembly of the
World Council of Indigenous Peoples (Panama, 1984), reproduced in Report of the
Working Group on Indigenous Populationson its Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1985/22, Annex III quoted in Hannum, supra note 39, at 669-70.
103. Draft Declarationof PrinciplesProposed by the Indian Law Resource Center,
Four Directions Council, National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Service, National
Indian Youth Council, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, and the InternationalIndian
Treaty Council, reproduced in Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22. Annex III, quoted in
Hannum, supra note 39, at 670 n.76.
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arise with indigenous peoples over the importance indigenous peoples
attach to the issue of self-determination. At the sixth session of the
Working Group, for example, an overwhelming majority of indigenous
group representatives declared that self-determination and self-government must be included as fundamental principles of any draft declaration. Some of these representatives indicated that treaty states had recognized rights of self-determination and self-government for indigenous
peoples but that these states also violated these fundamental rights.",
Indigenous representatives repeatedly expressed the view that these
treaties represent "nation-to-nation relations, connote recognition of the
legal capacity of indigenous peoples, and in no way impair the right to
exercise indigenous sovereignty." The representatives emphasized particularly "the recognition of the sovereign capacity of indigenous peoples to
enter into bilateral agreements with other sovereign nations. .. 2 05
Furthermore, "[a] number of indigenous observers referred to the importance of treaties entered into between states and indigenous peoples in
providing recognition, not only of the legal capacity of indigenous peoples, but also of indigenous self-determination.' 0 6 These "[t]reaties were
said to recognize and confirm indigenous autonomy, self-government,
and self-determination ... "'0'
Indigenous peoples claim the right to self-determination, although the
meaning particular groups attach to the concept of self-determination
varies, and not all indigenous peoples aspire to independent statehood.'0 8

104. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
106. The Martinez Cobo Report already had noted the "paramount importance" of
treaties to indigenous peoples. Martinez Cobo Report, supra note 66, paras. 388-89.
107. Report on Indigenous Populations, supra note 98, at 110.
108. For example, the Dene of Canada's Northwest Territories seek "the recognition
of the Dene nation by the governments and the peoples of the world," and "independence
and self-determination within the country of Canada." Dene Declaration, Statement of

Rights, July 19, 1975, reprinted in Davies, Aboriginal Rights in InternationalLaw:
Human Rights, in ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE LAW: INDIAN, MTIS AND INUIT
745, 781 (B. Morse ed. 1985) (emphasis added).
On the other hand, the indigenous participants in the 1977 International NGO Conference on Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations in the Americas proposed that
indigenous peoples who desired it and who met the fundamental requirements for statehood be granted "recognition as nations, and proper subjects of international law;" that
"[i]ndigenous nations or groups shall be accorded such degree of independence as they
may desire in accordance with international law;" and that treaties between indigenous
peoples and states be "recognized and applied in the same manner and according to the
same international laws and principles as the treaties and agreements entered into by
other States." Reprinted in Martinez Cobo Report, supra note 66, Annex IV, 1-2.
RIGHTS IN CANADA,
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Unfortunately, states fear that self-determination ultimately leads to secession. Consequently, in UN literature, the right to self-determination
always is accompanied by a ritual obeisance to the "national unity" or to
the "territorial integrity" of the state.10 9 Care and flexibility on both
sides are needed if the issue of self-determination is not to block progress
on indigenous rights in the UN. A declaration will be of little value to
indigenous peoples if it cannot attract the broadest possible support.
A non-binding declaration could be the first step towards a binding
international convention." 0 Even absent a subsequent convention, a declaration could still begin a process leading to the emergence of a new
norm of customary international law. Such a norm could emerge, however, only if a sufficiently large and representative number of states support the declaration and demonstrate, through subsequent state practice,
that they feel obliged to observe its principles."'
A related issue is the importance indigenous peoples attach to their
"sovereignty" or "statehood."1 2 Indigenous groups want both greater
control of their own destinies and international recognition of their
unique status, which they view as "clearly distinct from minorities or
other tribal and ethnic groups.""' 3 This desire for international recogni-

109. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1514(xv), 1 U.N. GAOR (947th plen. mtg.) supp. (No. 16)
188, 1989, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). Article 2 states that "[a]ll peoples have the right
to self-determination," but article 6 adds that "[any attempt aimed at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."
110. For instance, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights eventually led to the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention
on Economic and Social Rights.
111. Greig explained this process as follows:
In order for a customary rule to develop, it must at some stage be possible to
imply from the conduct of a group of states that between them it is regarded as a
matter of legal duty that they should act in a certain way. Such a rule will only
attain the position of a general rule of international law if a sufficient number of
states accept it as binding on them, and if the rest of the international community
fail to register an effective protest ....
D. GREIG, supra note 1, at 26.
112. See supra text accompanying note 108; the Dene Declaration and the Declaration of the 1977 International NGO Conference, on Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations in the Americas.
113. The Martinez Cobo Report observed:
[Indigenous peoples] consider themselves to be the historical successors of the peoples and nations that existed on their territories before the coming of the invaders
of these territories, who eventually prevailed over them and imposed on them colonial or other forms of subjugation, and whose historical successors now form the
predominant sectors of society. It is also abundantly clear that indigenous peoples
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tion does not mean necessarily that indigenous peoples desire full statehood status under international law, but such recognition is important in
terms of dignity and self-respect. Additionally, international recognition
has a practical aspect: without even a modicum of international legal
personality, indigenous peoples had no international forum to hear their
14
special claims until the establishment of the UN Working Group.
Nevertheless, the concept of indigenous sovereignty or statehood is bound
to cause problems for national governments, and the Working Group's
study on treaties could become a focus for such concerns.
III.

THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF TREATIES

A.

The Legal Significance of Treaties

National governments often refrain from using the ter i "treaty" in
relation to their indigenous populations, for fear of possible international
legal implications. For example, in 1871, the United States Congress
prohibited the signing of further treaties with Indian tribes, stating that
"[n]o Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States
shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or
power with whom the United States may contract by treaty ....
In
Canada, two commentators" 6 claim there is "virtually a conspiracy of
silence ''n 7 concerning the early treaties concluded with Indians in Maritime provinces, precisely because those treaties had a more definite international character than the later, more famous numbered treaties."" In
1981, when the Australian government agreed to examine the idea of an
agreement between the Commonwealth and Aboriginal people, it noted
that "the Government cannot legitimately negotiate anything which
might be regarded as a 'treaty,' implying as it does an internationally
recognized agreement between two nations."" 9
consider themselves different from those other peoples and demand the right to be
considered different by other sectors of society and by the international community.
Martinez Cobo Report, supra note 66, para. 376.

114.
115.
116.

See supra text accompanying note 54.

117.

Id. at 62.

118.

Id. at 62-65.

119.

Attachment to March 3, 1981 letter from Minister of Aboriginal Affairs to Na-

25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988).
Barsh & Henderson, supra note 40, at 55.

tional Chairman, National Aboriginal Conference, cited in Two Hundred Years Later
. . .Report by the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs on
the Feasibility of a Compact or 'Makarrata'between the Commonwealth and Aboriginal
People 20-21 (1983) [hereinafter Two Hundred Years Later].
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States fear the argument that indigenous peoples might be entities
with independent legal existence and, therefore, legitimate claims either
to full political independence or to a more equal association with their
state of nationality. Normally, treaties are concluded between states or
other entities with international legal personality, 120 while individuals or
groups that are the subjects of a state on the international plane cannot
act on their own behalf. 2 ' Above all, because national governments are
fearful of raising doubts about their legitimacy and of encouraging separatist movements, they want to avoid giving the impression that they believe in the sovereignty or nationhood of their indigenous peoples. Accordingly, treaties with indigenous peoples are not regarded as
international instruments.' 22
At the same time, indigenous peoples attach great symbolic importance
to the existence of such treaties as evidence of their sovereignty or nationhood. 2 The precise legal content of the terms used in this context is
unclear. Some individuals and groups argue their sovereignty never has
been legally extinguished and that they have the right to external selfdetermination, including the option of full independence. 1 24 Some seek
domestic and international recognition as a "nation" within an existing
nation, 12 6 while others would be satisfied with acknowledgment of their
26
former sovereignty and more equitable arrangements for the future.'
All indigenous peoples, however, agree on the importance of sovereignty
and self-determination, and the relevance of treaties in that context.
B.

International Instruments?

Article 2(1)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Vienna Convention) defines treaty as "an international agreement con-

120. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES art. 2(1)(a), 3 (1969);
see also D. GREIG, supra note 1,at 456-58.
121. D. GREIG,.supra note 1,at 92-93, 118.
122. See infra Part III.B.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
124.

Similarly, the indigenous participants in the 1977 International NGO Confer-

ence on Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations in the Americas proposed that
indigenous peoples who desired it and who met the fundamental requirements for state-

hood be granted "recognition as nations, and proper subjects of international law." Reprinted in Martinez Cobo Report, supra note 66, Annex IV, 1-2.

125. The Dene of Canada's Northwest Territories seek "the recognition of the Dene
nation by the governments and the peoples of the world," and "independence and selfdetermination within the country of Canada." Dene Declaration, Statement of Rights,
July 19, 1975. Reprinted in Davies, supra note 108, at 745, 781 (emphasis added).

126. See infra text accompanying notes 344-46.
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cluded between States in written form and governed by international
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation. 1217 Although the
Vienna Convention applies only to written agreements, this does not necessarily mean treaties must be in written form,' 28 although they usually
are. Treaties also do not necessarily have to be between states,' 29 but
they usually are, because states are the primary international actors and
the traditional subjects of international law.' 30 As international agreements, however, treaties must be concluded between parties that have the
capacity to act on the international plane, and they must be governed by
international law. 3 ' No agreement, whatever its title, that fails to meet
these criteria can be considered a treaty in the international legal sense.
The treaties indigenous peoples have concluded with national governments are not regarded as international instruments, because indigenous
peoples are not regarded as subjects of international law.' 32 To the extent such treaties with indigenous peoples have been considered in international tribunals, they are regarded more as contracts than as treaties
between sovereign states. For example, in Cayuga Indians v. United
States,'3 3 the American-British Claims Commission held that treaties between the Cayuga Indians and the State of New York were municipal
contracts. Specifically, the commission noted that "[n]either in form nor
in substance was the Treaty of 1795 [with the Cayuga Indians] a Federal treaty; it was a contract of New York with respect to a matter as to
which New York was, fully competent to contract."' 3 4 To justify this
conclusion, the Commission explained that the Cayugas, as an Indian
tribe, were not a legal entity under international law.' 5 In Island of

127. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 45 (R. Wetzel ed.
1978).
128. Article 3 makes it clear that agreements outside the scope of the Convention can
still be treaties under customary international law. Id.
129. Id.
130. "States are, of course, the principal examples of international persons. The attributes of statehood, as developed in customary law, provided the criteria for determining the 'personality' of other entities. Indeed, under the traditional view only fully sovereign states could be persons in international law." L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER
& H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 168 (1980).
131. D. GREIG, supra note 1, at 451.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
133. 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 173 (1926).
134. Id. at 186.
135. The claims commission held that:
The obligee was the "Cayuga Nation" an Indian tribe. Such a tribe is not a legal
unit of international law. The American Indians have never been so regarded ....
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Palmas,3 6 Justice Huber, the arbitrator, reached a similar conclusion:
As regards contracts between a State or a Company such as the Dutch
East India Company and native princes or chiefs of peoples not recog-

nized as members of the community of nations, they are not, in the international law sense, treaties or conventions capable of creating rights and
obligations such as may, in international law, arise out of treaties. 37
On the other hand, contrary authority argues that some American Indian nations meet the accepted criteria of statehood, including the capacity to enter into international agreements, and that they retain this capacity irregardless of international acknowledgment.' 8 United States
practice before 1871 also supports this view.' 39 In Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,40 the United States Supreme Court cited treaty agreements as
evidence that the United States government had recognized the Cherokee
nation as a state.' 4' The Court found that although Indian tribes were
From the time of the discovery of America the Indian tribes have been treated as
under the exclusive protection of the power which by discovery or conquest or
cession held the land which they occupied .... So far as an Indian tribe exists as
a legal unit, it is by virtue of the domestic law of the sovereign nation within
whose territory the tribe occupies the land, and so far only as that law recognizes
it.
Id. at 176 (citations omitted).
136. 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928).
137. Id. at 858 (emphasis original).
138. Clinebell & Thomson, supra note 10, at 672-79.
139. According to Cumming and Mickenberg,
[T]he Federal power to make treaties was the basis for both international treaties
and agreements with the Indians. During the treaty-making period, American Indian tribes were described as dependent nationalities and a tribal Indian was a
legal alien. In 1828, the United States Attorney-General examined the contention
that the treaties between the Indians and the United States were ineffective because they were not treaties with an independent nation. In his opinion, he concluded that the Indian tribes had sufficient independence for the purpose of entering into treaties.
NATIVE RIGHTS IN CANADA, supra note 13, at 54 (footnotes omitted).
140. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
141. Chief Justice Marshall reasoned:
They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our country.
The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize them as a
people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsible
in their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their
community. Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our
government plainly recognize the Cherokee Nation as a state, and the courts are
bound by those acts.
Id. at 16.
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not foreign states, they were "domestic dependent nations."142 In
Worcester v. Georgia,4" the Supreme Court regarded the relationship
between Indian tribes and the United States as a protectorate in the original sense of the term."" The Court also refused to distinguish between
international treaties and Indian treaties.' 4 5
The Court did not hold that Indian tribes had the legal capacity to
conclude treaties with states other than the United States, as the protectorate relationship implicitly limited their external relations powers. 14 6
Although Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning in support of Indian sovereignty placed the tribes clearly within United States federal jurisdiction,

142. Chief Justice Marshall further wrote:
[I]t may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated
foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of
their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
Id. at 17.
143. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
144. "This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one
more powerful: not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master." Id. at 555. The Court explained this relationship as follows:
[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence-its right to self-government, by associating with a
stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety,
may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself
of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state.
Id. at 560-61.
145. The Court provided the following discussion of treaties:
The Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made,
to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties
with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers
who are capable of making treaties. The words "treaty" and "nation" are words of
our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them
to Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are
applied to all in the same sense.
Id. at 559-60.
146. The Court explained that:
They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves,
as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States,
that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connexion with them,
would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17-18.
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the United States Congress eventually became concerned about possible
international legal implications of its treaties with the Indians. The Act
of March 3, 1871, which prohibited the conclusion of further treaties,
formally declared that "[n]o Indian nation or tribe within the territory of
the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent
nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty," although it confirmed the binding character of existing treaties. 14 7 This statutory language strongly implies that Indian tribes could
have been acknowledged as independent states before the Act was
passed.' 4 8 Henceforth, United States Indian treaties were regarded as
purely domestic instruments, regardless of their true status before March
1871. If the Indian tribes had the capacity to conclude international treaties, the right of Congress to terminate that capacity unilaterally is ques49
tionable at best. Nevertheless, the 1871 Act disposed of the matter.
The United States approach before 1871 was unique. In Canada, although there is no clear definition of the status of the Canadian Indian
treaties under domestic law, 5" case law confirms that Indian treaties
have been regarded as contracts rather than international instruments.'
In Pawis v. Regina,'52 the Canadian Court noted that:

147. See Barsh & Henderson, supra note 40, at 55.
148. A Canadian judge in Rex v. Wesley supported this interpretation:
Until the year 1871 the United States conceded to the Indian tribes the right to
treat upon terms of national equality and numbers of treaties were entered into
which were deemed to have the same dignity and effect as a treaty with a foreign
nation. In the year 1871 this was changed by statute.
[1932] 2 W.W.R. 337, 351 (Alta. App. Div.) (McGillivray, J.).
149. According to Gumming and Mickenberg, "[t]here is no indication in the American materials examined that the power of Congress to terminate treaty-making with the
Indians was open to challenge." NATIVE RIGHTS IN CANADA, supra note 13, at 55 n.17.
150. Sanders, AboriginalPeoples and the Constitution, 19 ALTA. L. REV. 410, 41719 (1981).
151. One well-known example is Rex v. Syliboy, in which the court held:
Treaties are unconstrained Acts of independent powers. But the Indians were
never regarded as an independent power. A civilized nation first discovering a
country of uncivilized people or savages held such country as its own until such
time as by treaty it was transferred to some other civilized nation. The savages'
right of sovereignty even of ownership was never recognized .... In my judgment
the Treaty of 1752 is not a treaty at all and is not to be treated as such; it is at
best a mere agreement ....
1 D.L.R. 307, 313 (1929).

In Rex v. Wesley, Justice McGillivray argued that Canada's Indian treaties were "on
no higher plane than other formal agreements," a status he saw as distinct from that of
United States treaties before 1871. [1932] 2 W.W.R. 337, 351.
152. 102 D.L.R.3d 602 (1980).
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It is obvious that the Lake-Huron Treaty, like all Indian treaties, was not
a treaty in the international law sense. The Ojibways did not then constitute an "independent power," they were subjects of the Queen. Although
very special in nature and difficult to precisely define, the Treaty has to be
taken as an agreement entered into by the Sovereign and a group of her
subjects with the intention to create special legal relations between them
... . The agreement can therefore be said to be tantamount to a contract
153

European powers frequently used treaties with native chiefs to acquire
territory in Africa, Asia, and Australia.' 5 4 The status and legal significance of these treaties varied from case to case. 15 5 The Treaty of
Waitangi, which ceded the North Island of New Zealand to Britain, is
one example. In 1839, British authorities recognized New, Zealand as a
state, but not as a full member of the community of nations:
We acknowledge New Zealand as a sovereign and independent state, so
far at least as it is possible to make that acknowledgement in favour of a
people composed of numerous, dispersed and petty tribes, who possess few
political relations to each other, and are incompetent to act, or even to
deliberate, in concert.IBG
This language suggests that the Maori tribes possessed "at least a degree
of legal status" and that the treaty had some international character. The
terms of the treaty, however, entail a complete surrender of sovereignty
1 57
to the British Crown.

153. Id. at 607.
154. M. LINDLEY, supra note 19, at 31-43.
155. Crawford has observed that:
If the native community was a State, or possessed a degree of legal status, then the
treaty was either generally or pro tanto of an international kind. However, that

did not mean that the community remained a State-or retained its lesser international status-subsequent to the treaty. Before cession or protectorate, the status
and interpretation of the treaty depended on the status of the community: subsequently, the status of the community depended to a large extent on the treaty and,
in some cases, on subsequent practice or usage. Even where the treaty purported to
guarantee benefits to the community or its members in perpetuity, cessions of territory tended in practice to be regarded as absolute.
J. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 182 (footnote omitted).
156. Secretary for War and Colonies Dispatch, August 1839. Parliamentary Papers,
1840, volume XXXIII (238) quoted in M. LINDLEY, supra note 19, at 41.

157. Britain's position was clear:
The chiefs of the confederation of the united tribes of New Zealand, and the separate and independent chiefs who have not become members of the confederation,
cede to Her Majesty, the Queen of England, absolutely, and without reservation,
all the rights and powers of sovereignty which the said confederation or individual
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To the extent the Treaty of Waitangi acknowledged Maori sovereignty over the North Island of New Zealand, it likewise extinguished
that sovereignty. In effect, Britain treated the Maori signatories as a
state only to the extent of asserting its own sovereignty over the North
Island by means of an agreement, rather than through discovery and
effective occupation as it did with the South Island. The Treaty of
Waitangi arguably falls within Huber's category of contracts with native
princes or chiefs "not recognized as members of the community of nations," which he regarded as "a form of internal organisation of a colonial territory."1 8 International law governed the Treaty of Waitangi
only in the sense that the rest of the international community considered
such treaties of cession as a valid means of acquiring title to inhabited
territory, and not in the sense that the Maori parties were considered
subjects of international law. Clearly, the Treaty of Waitangi does not
support the case for indigenous sovereignty as did some of the treaties
Britain concluded with the American Indians.
In summary, existing treaties concluded with indigenous peoples are
not international treaties under either domestic or international law, and
have not been regarded as international agreements for at least the last
century. Indigenous peoples lack the necessary international legal personality.' 5 9 Accordingly, the existence of treaties does not in itself prove
anything about indigenous sovereignty or statehood under contemporary
international law.
C.

The Practical Value of Treaties

Although some North American treaties, especially earlier ones, had a
definite political character, many were essentially land transactions in
which the government gained new land for settlement and exploitation in
return for compensation and the setting aside of specified areas for the
Indians' exclusive use. The treaties were not an original source of Indian
rights. They merely formalized the surrender of the Indians' title to
specified areas of land and guaranteed those rights that had not been
surrendered.160 United States courts recognized Indian title to land even

chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess,
over their respective territories as the sole sovereigns thereof.
M. LINDLEY, supra note 19, at 42.
158. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 858 (1928).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
160. For example, the treaties between the United States and the Cherokee, as summarized by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6. Pet.) 515
(1832), "mark out the boundary that separates the Cherokee country from Georgia;
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when no treaty existed."6 ' The source of title to this land was occupancy
or possession, not a governmental act. 16 2 Similarly, Canada accepted that
original Indian title continued undisturbed until it was lawfully extinguished by the Crown.163 Canada also used treaties as one means of
clearing title to lands required for settlement or resource development.""
Treaty guarantees, however, were far from absolute. The Cherokee
Indians, for example, were expelled forcibly from lands guaranteed to
them by treaty, 65 even though the United States Supreme Court had
upheld their treaty rights in Worcester v. Georgia.1 66 While United
States federal courts traditionally have been reluctant to deny treaty obligations16 7 and generally consider themselves bound to construe treaties
liberally in favor of the Indians,"6 8 less dramatic violations of treaty proguaranty to them all the land within their boundary; solemnly pledge the faith of the
United States to restrain their citizens from trespassing on it; and recognize the preexisting power of the nation to govern itself." Id. at 561-62.
161. See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923); United States v. Santa
Fe Pac. R.R. Co. 314 U.S. 339 (1941); Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct.

Cl. 487 (1967).
162. "Nor is it true, as respondent urges, that a tribal claim to any particular lands
must be based upon a treaty, statute, or other formal government action." Santa Fe Pac.
R.R. Co., 314 U.S. at 347.
Indian title based on aboriginal possession does not depend on sovereign recognition or affirmative acceptance for its survival. Once established in fact, it endures
until extinguished or abandoned ....
The correct enquiry is, not whether the Republic of Texas accorded or granted
the Indians any rights, but whether that sovereign extinguished their pre-existing
occupancy rights.
Lipan Apache Tribe, 180 Ct. Cl. at 492 (citations omitted).
163. St. Catharines Milling & Lumber Co. v. Regina, 13 S.C.R. 577 (1887).
164. In the 11 "numbered treaties" negotiated between 1871 and 1921 with Indians
of northern and western Canada, the Indians surrendered all title to their land in return
for annuities and reservations. Treaties one through seven also promised them tools, livestock, and seed grain so they could take up agriculture, and Treaties three through
eleven guaranteed their hunting and fishing rights over the ceded territory. Zlotkin, PostConfederation Treaties, in ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE LAW: INDIAN, MErIs AND
INUIT RIGHTS IN CANADA 272, 273-74 (B. Morse ed. 1985).
165. Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the
United States, 27 BUFFALO L. REv. 637, 656, 664-65 (1978).
166. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
167. See, e.g., id.
168. In Worcester, Justice McLean reasoned that "[t]he language used in treaties
with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice." Id. at 582 (McLean, J.).
In Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899), the Court noted that, given the unequal status of
the parties, "the treaty must therefore be construed not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be
understood by the Indians." Id. at 11. However, Mason cites Oliphant v. Suquamish
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visions are not uncommon."6 9 The United States Supreme Court rationalized this situation in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,'"0 by finding "that
Congress' 'plenary power' over Indians gave it the right to take any action concerning Indians regardless of treaty provisions. "7
In Canada, the courts regarded treaty obligations as moral or political
in character, rather than as legally binding instruments. In St.
CatharinesMilling & Lumber Co. v. Regina,17 2 the Canadian Supreme
Court held that:
The Indians must in the future, every one concedes it, be treated with the
same consideration for their just claims and demands that they have received in the past, but, as in the past, it will not be because of any legal
obligation to do so, but as a sacred political obligation, in the execution of
which the state must be free from judicial control.' 73
74
In Attorney-Generalfor Canada v. Attorney-Generalfor Ontario,
the Judicial Committee held that the treaty right at issue amounted to no
more than "a promise and agreement." ' 5 Justice Johnson used this
phrase in Regina v. Sikyea,'7 ' in which he stated, "[t]his 'promise and
agreement,' like any other, can, of course, be breached, and there is no
law of which I am aware that would prevent Parliament by legislation,
properly within s. 91 of the B.N.A. Act, from doing so.'" This is not to
say that Canadian courts do not take treaties seriously; on the contrary,
they have placed some emphasis on the moral, if not legal, obligations
involved. For example, after determining that a particular treaty between Indians and the Canadian Government was not a true international treaty, the court in Rex v. Syliboy' 8 noted that:
Having called the agreement a treaty, and having perhaps lulled the Indians into believing it to be a treaty with all the sacredness of a treaty attached to it, it may be the Crown should not now be heard to say it is not
a treaty .... That is a matter for representations to the proper authori-

Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) as an example of a treaty liberally construed against
the Indians. Mason, supra note 63, at 450 n.228.

169. This was effectuated through the United States Government's reservation policy. Mason, supra note 63, at 451.
170. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
171. Mason, supra note 63, at 450 n.228, 451.

172, 13 S.C.R. 577 (1887).
173. Id. at 649.
174. 1897 App. Cas. 199.
175. Id. at 213.
176.

43 D.L.R.2d 150 (1964).

177. Id. at 154.
178. [1929] 1 D.L.R. 307 (1928).
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could hardly fail to be successful.17 9

While Canada has no special rules for the judicial interpretation of Indian treaties, there is a tendency to construe them in favor of the Indians. 180 On occasion, Canadian courts have upheld treaty rights against
provincial legislation,1 8 ' but they also have ruled that federal legislation
prevails over treaty rights." 2 This reflects that under the British-North
America Act, the Indians were under federal legislative jurisdiction and
subject to provincial laws of general application, which in turn were sub83
ject to the terms of treaties or federal legislation.1
Until quite recently, New Zealand's Treaty of Waitangi has not been
any more useful as a guarantee of Maori rights. In 1847, the court in
Regina v. Symonds'84 held that aboriginal title was a legal right, albeit
vulnerable to legislative extinguishment, and the Treaty of Waitangi was
merely declaratory of that right.' Subsequent court decisions, however,
took a more restrictive approach to Maori title. In Wi Paratav. Bishop
8
of Wellington,"'
the court viewed the issue of a Crown grant as an
implied extinguishment of native title.'8 " The court ruled that the Treaty
of Waitangi could not establish the Maori's right of occupancy as a legal
right, since, as far as it purported to cede the sovereignty of New Zealand, it was still a "simple nullity."' The Treaty, in fact, was declaratory of the Crown's rights and duties under international law as following the annexation of New Zealand.' Not only did Maori rights exist
only at the sufferance of the Crown, but in Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker, 90
the court declared the Crown's actions in that context were not subject to
judicial review.' 9 1 The trend in New Zealand courts has been to enforce
179. Id,at 314.
180. NATIVE RIGHTS IN CANADA, supra note 13, at 61; see also Regina v. White &
Bob, 50 D.L.R.2d 613, 651 (1964) (Norris J.A.); Regina v. Taylor & Williams, 34
O.R.2d 360, 267 (CA 1981).
181. See, e.g., White & Bob, 50 D.L.R.2d at 613; Taylor & Williams, 34 O.R.2d at
360.
182. Regina v. Sikyea, 43 D.L.R.2d 150, 159 (1964); Regina v. George, 55
D.L.R.2d 386 (1966).
183. George, 55 D.L.R.2d at 386.
184. [1847] N.Z.P.C.C. 387.
185. Id. at 390.
186. [1877] 3 N.Z.J.R. 72.
187. Id. at 77.
188. Id. at 78.
189. Id.
190. [1894] 11 N.Z.L.R. 483.
191. The court indicated that:
[T]he mere assertion of the claim of the Crown is in itself sufficient to oust the
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only statutorily created or Crown-granted Maori land rights.' 9 2 While
the 1909 Maori Land Act, which, as amended over the years, provided
statutorily recognized land rights, 9 ' the Act did not recognize these
rights as against the Crown. 94
Until the passage of the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 1975 (Waitangi
Act), the Treaty of Waitangi was of little benefit to the Maori Ln declaring legally enforceable rights. Essentially, the Waitangi Act established
the Waitangi Tribunal to investigate Maori claims that individuals or
tribal groups are likely to be affected prejudicially by government acts,
regulations, or practices that are inconsistent with the principles of the
Treaty.
The New Zealand High Court reassessed the Treaty of Waitangi in
Huakina Development Trust v. Waikato Valley Authority.'9 While the
Treaty still conferred no legally enforceable rights in itself, it did have
legal significance, because it was recognized by Parliament in the Treaty
of Waitangi Act of 1975 and the Waitangi Day Act of 1976.19 Furthermore, New Zealand inserted references to the Treaty's principles into
several statutes,'197 which led to judicial recognition of those principles

jurisdiction of this or any other Court in the colony. The Crown is under a solemn
engagement to observe strict justice in the matter, but of necessity it must be left to
the conscience of the Crown to determine what is justice.
Id. at 488.
192. McHugh, Aboriginal Title in New Zealand Courts, 2 CANTERBURY L. REV.
235, 253 (1984).
193. Id. at 265.
194. Id.
195. [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 188.
196. The court noted:
This review of the authorities invites the conclusion that the Treaty is not part of
the municipal law of New Zealand in the sense that it gives rights enforceable in
the Courts by virtue of the Treaty itself .... [T]he authorities also show that the
Treaty was essential to the foundation of New Zealand and since then there has
been considerable direct and indirect recognition by statute of the obligations of the
Crown to the Maori people. Among the direct recognitions are the Treaty of
Waitangi Act of 1975 and the Waitangi Day Act of 1976 both of which expressly
bind the Crown. There can be no doubt that the Treaty is part of the fabric of
New Zealand society. It follows that it is part of the context in which legislation
which impinges upon its principles is to be interpreted when it is proper, in accordance with the principles of statutory interpretation, to have resort to extrinsic
material.
Id. at 210.
197. See, e.g., State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986; Environment Act 1986; Conservation Act 1987. Palmer, Law, Land, and Maori Issues, 3 CANTERBURY L. REV. 322,
338-45 (1988).
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for the first time."' Because legislation now incorporates the Treaty's
principles, the Treaty finally is serving as an effective guarantee of Maori rights. Nevertheless, rights under the Treaty are not directly enforceable in municipal law, and there is no legal restraint on Parliament's
ability to override its provisions or principles. 91
While it is a fair assumption that the North American treaties have
played an important part in preventing the total erosion of Indian rights,
their effectiveness as a guarantee of Indian rights is limited severely,
most notably by the federal government's ability to ignore, override, or
unilaterally abrogate treaty provisions. In New Zealand, the Treaty of
Waitangi has become a useful guarantee of Maori rights only since the
government took legislative action to that effect, over 130 years after the
Treaty was signed. But, because the guarantee depends on statutory action rather than on the treaty itself, Parliament has the power to modify
or remove it.
D. Modern Treaty Substitutes
Two modern "non-treaties" also warrant examination in this discussion: the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA) and
the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement of 1978 (James Bay
Agreement). These "non-treaties" illustrate two different approaches to
indigenous claims: a government-devised "settlement" without formal
negotiations with the indigenous communities concerned, and an agreement arrived at through negotiation between governments and indigenous communities.
No treaties had ever been concluded with the Indian, Inuit, and Aleut
peoples of Alaska, essentially because their traditional lands were of no
particular interest to the United States Government.2"' The perceived
need to settle the unextinguished indigenous claims that covered over
ninety percent of Alaska2 °0 arose with the discovery of important petroleum reserves in the region and subsequent plans for a pipeline across
the state.202 ANCSA was not a negotiated agreement.20 3 Several indige-

198. N. Z. Maori Council & Latimer v. Her Majesty's Attorney-General, [1987] 6
N.Z.A.R. 353.
199. Id. at 371, 399.
200. Morse, The Resolution of Land Claims, in ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE
LAW: INDIAN, METIS AND INUIT RIGHTS IN CANADA 617, 669 (B. Morse ed. 1985).
201. NATIVE RIGHTS IN CANADA,supra note 13, at 265.
202. Morse, supra note 200, at 669.
203. "Although the Indian, Inuit and Aleut populations appeared before congressional committees and actively lobbied in the halls of Congress, they did not actually
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nous organizations, however, supported ANCSA as the best possible settlement at that time. 0 4 The legislation extinguished indigenous title to
land throughout Alaska, along with indigenous hunting and fishing
rights, in return for a large cash settlement and title to approximately
ten percent of the state's territory.2 0 5 While the settlement may seem
generous by historical standards, it did not guarantee indigenous land
ownership "in perpetuity" or protect indigenous subsistence-matters of
major concern to the peoples involved.206 As an exchange of most of the
land involved for specified concessions, ANOSA continues the tradition
of North American treaties. ANCSA's innovative element is a set of
complicated arrangements to apportion compensation money and land
among a specially established network of regional and village corporations designed to encourage native economic development.107 Unfortunately, ANOSA has fallen short of its goals, and rather than providing a
positive new start for the native peoples of Alaska, it is a focus of
discontent.20 8
Unlike ANOSA, the James Bay Agreement was the product of negotiations with indigenous peoples. One commentator described it as "the
broadest and most exhaustive land claim settlement involving indigenous
people anywhere in the world."20 9 Under the terms of the James Bay
Agreement, the Cree and Inuit peoples of the region have surrendered
their aboriginal title in return for money, some land, and hunting, fishing, and trapping rights over additional areas of land. Quebec can expropriate all of these lands, subject to compensation, with the province retaining all mineral rights.210 While the core of the Agreement is the
surrender of aboriginal lands in return for specified concessions, the
Agreement addresses the important new dimension of active native involvement in, or control of, local and regional governments and authorities. 21 1 Other distinctive features of the James Bay Agreement are an

negotiate or have any control over the terms of the final settlement." Id.

204. T.

BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY

26 (1985). This is the report of the Alaska

Native Review Commission, sponsored by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and the
World Council of Indigenous Peoples to review ANCSA in 1983.
205.

Id. at 24.

206. Id. at 26.
207. Id. at 21-26.
208. Id. at 26.
209. Morse, supra note 200, at 657.
210. Id. at 656.
211. "The agreement also provides for the establishment of local and regional governments, environmental committees, health and social services boards, school boards,
separate police forces and economic development committees in which the Cree or Inuit
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income security program for Cree hunters and trappers, and environmental review'and assessment provisions.212 The Agreement has the status of a contract, and its provisions have been ratified and implemented
in federal and provincial legislation.2 1
Indigenous groups have had a mixed response to the James Bay
Agreement. One source claims that the Cree and Inuit generally are satisfied with its terms, but are dissatisfied with its implementation.21 4 Another source offers more resounding criticism by noting that "most of the
native peoples affected" ' 5 have rejected the Agreement, and that the native leaders negotiated a poor settlement from a poor bargaining
stance.21 6
Indigenous groups undoubtedly are in a poor bargaining position
when dealing with governments, even in genuine negotiations. Nevertheless, the James Bay Agreement pays more attention than ANCSA to the
key concerns of the indigenous peoples with whom it negotiated. Admittedly, the problems with ANCSA are partly organizational and partly
administrative, but the basic assumptions behind its compensation arrangements are fundamentally out of step with the aspirations of the
native communities involved. Furthermore, ANCSA largely has ignored
the indigenous groups' primary concerns of secure long-term title to their
land and the continued viability of their traditional subsistence economy.
Presumably, these differences reflect that the ANCSA process involved

participate actively or control." Id.
212. Moss, The Implementation of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement,
in ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE LAW:
ADA 684, 684 (B. Morse ed. 1985).

213.

INDIAN, METIS AND INUIT RIGHTS IN CAN-

Id.

214. According to a consultant for the Cree, "[tihe Cree and Inuit still maintain that
the Agreement is satisfactory in its terms, even though both groups have been very unhappy about the performance of both [federal and provincial] governments on certain
aspects of it." Id. at 686.
215. Barsh, Indigenous Policy in Australia and North America, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ABORIGINAL HUMAN RIGHTS 95, 100 (B. Hocking ed. 1988).
216. One commentator has observed:
Natives' designated representatives often have a personal stake in seeing that some
agreement, however bad, is reached. Native leaders are under pressure from both
sides to demonstrate their ability and justify their leadership. Native technocrats
are also frequently the major beneficiaries of cash settlements and the establishment of new administrative machinery. As a result, government can usually rely
on native leaders to rationalise concessions and conceal failures for as long as possible. The principal Cree negotiator for the 1976 James Bay agreement was its
leading exponent until the full details of the settlement emerged. He then became
the agreement's most aggressive critic.
Id. at 100-01.
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only limited consultations with indigenous peoples, while the James Bay
Agreement was the product of a formal negotiating process.
IV.

AN ABORIGINAL "TREATY"?

Australia's approach to indigenous concerns differs from North
America's in two key respects. First, Australia did not conclude treaties
with its indigenous inhabitants. 211 Second, Australia has not judicially
recognized that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander land rights exist
218
other than those conferred by statute.
A.

The Settled Colony

In the minds of colonial authorities, the European encroachment on
Aboriginal land and the sustained violence against resisting Aborigines
did not constitute war. Australia was regarded as established by settlement rather than conquest. Because Europeans viewed Australia as terra
nullius, Britain acquired it by effective occupation.219 Of course, the
land was not without an owner-it was owned by the Aborigines who
had occupied it from time immemorial. Terra nullius, however, refers to
territory that is not under anyone's sovereignty. The test for sovereignty
is whether the people concerned have attained a sufficient degree of social and political organization.2 20 Australia's indigenous inhabitants were
considered too primitive to exercise any degree of sovereignty or even
rights of ownership over their land.221
Contrary to colonial beliefs, we know today that the Aborigines did
have social and political organization and a system of customary law that
included rules governing rights and obligations to land. Given the
preconceptions of the time, it is not surprising that the first settlers failed
to recognize these facts. Nevertheless, settlers who came into contact with
the Aborigines must have realized quickly that the Aborigines had a
profound attachment to their land, well-defined ownership beliefs, and
217. The Batman "treaty" of 1835 is an exception that was really a private contract
for the purchase of Aboriginal land, and was repudiated by the colonial authorities.

Keon-Cohen, The Makarrata:a Treaty within Australia between Australians-Some
Legal Issues, CURRENT AFF. BULL., Feb. 1, 1985, at 4, 6.
218. In Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty Ltd., 17 F.L.R. 141 (1971), Justice Blackburn

explicitly rejected the contention that communal native title was part of the common law
of Australia. Id. at 244-45.

219.

Keon-Cohen, supra note 217, at 5; Cooper v. Stuart, 14 App. Cas. 286 (1889).

220.

For a discussion of the concept of terra nullius, see supra text accompanying

notes 19-37.
221. Keon-Cohen, supra note 217, at 5.
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customary laws. Even so, the settlers never seriously pursued the possibility of negotiating treaties or other land-surrender instruments with the
Aborigines.2 22
Despite some legal controversy during the first part of the nineteenth
century,223 the proposition that Australia was terra nullius acquired legitimately by settlement first received judicial endorsement in the 1889
decision of Cooper v. Stuart.224 As recently as 1978, Justice Gibbs considered it "fundamental to our legal system that the Australian colonies
became British possessions by settlement and not by conquest,"2'25 and
cited Cooper v. Stuart as authority for the proposition that Australia
always has been regarded as a settled colony. 26 Justice Murphy, how227
ever, noted that this view was not binding on the High Court.
The implications of the terra nullius doctrine-thaft the people concerned were too "primitive" to exercise sovereignty over their territory,
or even to own their land-understandably are offensive to indigenous
peoples. These implications, therefore, explain the symbolic importance
indigenous peoples attribute to treaties. 22 s The existence of a treaty recognizes that the indigenous community has both the capacity and rights
necessary to enter a treaty. The idea that inhabited land can be terra
nullius denies both, and explains in part the importance on which Aboriginal Australians place the notion, of their unsurrendered sovereignty,
and their vehement rejection of the idea that Australia was a settled colony.229 In Australia, the terra nullius doctrine also trivializes the Aborigines' sustained resistance, against overwhelming odds, to European
encroachment on their lands 230 and denies Aboriginal Australians the

222, H. REYNOLDS, THE LAW OF THE LAND 54 (1988).
223. Hookey, Settlement and Sovereignty, in ABORIGINES AND THE LAW 1, 2-6 (P.
Hanks & B. Kcon-Cohen eds. 1988).
224. 14 App. Cas. 286, 291 (1889).
225. Coe v. Commonwealth of Australia, 24 A.L.R. 118, 129 (1978).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 137. Justice Aickin concurred with Justice Gibbs. Id. at 138. Justice
Jacobs agreed with Justice Murphy on this point:
The view has generally been taken that the Australian colonies were settled colonies; but, although that view was expressed in Cooper v. Stuart, 14 App. Cas. 286
(1989) and in Randwick v. Rutledge, 102 C.L.R. 54 (1959), there is no actual
decision of this court or of the Privy Council to that effect. The plaintiff should be
entitled to rely on the alternative argument when it comes to be determined
whether the aboriginal inhabitants of Australia had and have any rights in land.
Id. at 136.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
229. Two Hundred Years Later, supra note 119, at 37-42.
230. Id. at 42.
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right to be proud of their past.
In recent years, there has been a growing awareness that Aborigines
and Torres Strait Islanders deserve more respect than the terra nullius
doctrine suggests. The Australian Senate made the first formal acknowledgement of the Aborigines' prior occupation of Australia in a 1975 resolution urging Australia "to admit prior ownership by the said indigenous peoples, and introduce legislation to compensate the people now
known as Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders for dispossession of
their land." '' The matter rested until 1988, Australia's bicentennial
year, when the House of Representatives passed a resolution acknowledging the Aborigines' and Torres Strait Islanders' prior occupation of
Australia, and affirming their entitlement to "self-management and selfdetermination subject to the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of Australia."2" 2 The preamble to the draft Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) Bill acknowledged prior
ownership as well as prior occupation, and noted that compensation has
not yet been paid.233 The preamble also delineated its objectives of recognizing past dispossession, ensuring indigenous participation in government policy, and promoting self-determination. 2 4 Nevertheless, while
the ultimate goal of rectifying past injustices is admirable, 23" Australia is

231. Senate Journals, 367 quoted in Two Hundred Years Later, supra note 119, at
12.
232. AUSTL. H.R. DEBATES, Aug. 23, 1988, at 137.
233. Specifically, the ATSIC Bill's preamble provides:
...AND WHEREAS the peoples whose descendants are now known as the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples of Australia were the prior occupiers and original owners of this land;
AND WHEREAS they were dispossessed by subsequent European occupation
and have no recognized rights over land yet recognized by the Courts other than
those granted or recognized by the Crown;
AND WHEREAS that dispossession occurred without compensation and no serious attempt was made to reach a lasting and equitable agreement with them on
the use of their land;
AND WHEREAS, as a consequence of these and subsequent deprivations, the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have become; as a group, the most
disadvantaged in Australian society ....
A Bill for an Act to establish an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, and

for related purposes. Preamble, reprinted in A TREATY

WITH THE ABORIGINES?

48 (K.

Baker ed. 1988).
234. See id.
235. The preamble went on to state that:
it is the intention of the people of Australia to make provision for rectification ...
of the consequences of past injustices and to ensure for all time that the Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander peoples receive full recognition and status within the
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still a long way from achieving it. Unfortunately, this preamble was deleted from the ATSIC legislation by the Senate. s6 Its content, however,
was embodied in a separate Senate resolution that was sent to the House
23 7
of Representatives along with the Senate's amendments to the Bill.
The final paragraph of the Senate resolution provided "that an instrument of understanding and reconciliation with the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander peoples should be negotiated by the Australian
2 38
Government.
B.

Land Rights in a Settled Colony

Blackstone's distinction between settled and conquered, or ceded, colonies 238 has important legal consequences. In settled colonies, all applicable English laws automatically are in force from the moment of first
settlement. Conquered or ceded colonies, however, retain their own laws
until the new sovereign changes them. 24 ' Given Australia's classification
as a settled colony, "British law applied to the new colony insofar as its
conditions permitted, and that law chose not to recognise any special
rights vested in Aborigines. "241 Even though many now concede that
Australia was colonized by occupation in the face of some armed Aboriginal resistance, "the constitutional doctrines denying Aboriginal sover-

Australian nation to which history, their prior ownership and occupation of the
land, and their rich and diverse culture, fully entitle them to aspire ....
Id.
236. AUSTL. SENATE DEBATES, Oct. 17, 1989, at 2022.
237. Id.
238. AUSTL. H.R. DEBATES, Oct. 24, 1989, at 1685-86.
239. Blackstone described colonies as follows:
Plantations or colonies, in distant countries, are either such where the lands .are
claimed by right of occupancy only, by finding them desert and uncultivated, and
peopling them from the mother country; or where, when already cultivated, they
have [been] either gained, by conquest, or ceded to us by treaties.
I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *108.
240. Blackstone drew the following distinction:
There is a difference between these two species of colonies, with respect to the
laws by which they are bound. For it hath been held, that if an uninhabited country be discovered and planted by English subjects, all the English laws then in
being, which are the birthright of every subject, are immediately there in force
I.... But in conquered or ceded countries, that have already laws of their own,
the king may indeed alter and change those laws; but, till he does actually change
them, the antient [sic] laws of the country remain, unless such as are against the
law of God, as in the case of an infidel country.
Id. (footnotes omitted).

241.

Keon-Cohen, supra note 217, at 5.
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eignty and title to land remain."""
Australia's importation of British common law, with its feudal notions
of land tenure, was seen as incompatible with the notion of any continuing Aboriginal rights of land ownership.243 In North America, large areas of land were neither conquered from their indigenous inhabitants nor
ceded by them. For example, no treaties were ever concluded with the
Indians, Inuit, and Aleuts of Alaska.2 44 Further, the only treaties made
with the Indians of British Columbia applied to Vancouver Island,2 45
and the Inuit of Canada's north are not parties to any treaty. 246 Since
those areas were neither ceded nor conquered, they must have been acquired by settlement or, possibly, by prescription. 4 7 Yet, unlike the situation in Australia, the inhabitants of these areas unquestionably have
valid claims to their traditional lands as long as their government did not
extinguish their aboriginal title.24 s
In Australia, such claims are. not recognized. The plaintiff in
Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd.,249 for example, argued that "at common law, communal occupation of land by the aboriginal inhabitants of
242. Id.
243. For example, according to one source:
A basic principle of British law was that, on settlement, land vested in the Crown
which became the fons et origo of land rights in the Colony.
The land which was not alienated by way of freehold grant or for a lesser term
was designated as "wastelands of the Crown." There is no indication in the Australian cases that the radical title of the Crown to Australian land was subject to
any usufructuary right on the part of the Aboriginal inhabitants.
Lumb, Aboriginal Land Rights:JudicialApproaches in Perspective, 62 AusT. L.J. 273,
277 (1988) (footnote omitted). The cases referred to are: Williams v. Attorney-General
for New South Wales, 16 C.L.R. 404, 439 (1913); Randwick Corp. v. Rutledge, 102
C.L.R. 54, 71 (1959); Australia v. New South Wales, 33 C.L.R. 1, 28 (1923).
244. Morse, supra note 200, at 669.
245. Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, 34 D.L.R.3d 145, 163 (1923).
246. T. BERGER, NORTHERN FRONTIER, NORTHERN HOMELAND: THE REPORT OF
THE MACKENZIE VALLEY PIPELINE INQUIRY 1, 169 (1977).
247. Greig provides the following description of prescription:
Even if a particular land area is under the dominion of one state, it does not
follow that the taking possession of that area by another cannot create a new title.
Whereas occupation applies to a territory which is a res nullius, prescription applies a similar line of reasoning to territory that did have a sovereign. A combination of the passage of time and the implied acquiescence of the dispossessed sovereign are the basis of prescriptive rights.
D. GREIG, supra note 1, at 163.
248. Such claims are recognized by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. See
supra text accompanying notes 197-200; see also Calder v. Attorney-General of British
Columbia, 34 D.L.R.3d 145 (1973); Guerin v,Regina, 13 D.L.R.4th 321 (1984).
249. 17 F.L.R. 141 (1911).
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a territory acquired by the Crown is recognized as a legally enforceable
right"2 5 that could be extinguished only by the Crown.2 51 After a comprehensive survey of the relevant authorities,2 5 2 Justice Blackburn concluded that "English law, as applied to a settled colony,"'2 3 did not include a doctrine of communal native title "except under express statutory
provisions. ' 2 "' Blackburn then held "the doctrine does not form, and
never has formed, part of the law of any part of Australia."2 5 Blackburn emphasized Australia's settled status25 6 as a determinative factor in
establishing the absence of Aboriginal rights to land at common law.
One commentator suggests that the legal effects of settlement on indigenous rights, as distinct from conquest or cession, are less clear-cut in
that "[t]he importation of the common law associated with the establishment of a settled colony does not necessarily involve the extinction of
existing rights in land. Those in possession, at least, may be protected." 2 7 This contention finds some support in two Canadian cases
concerning land in British Columbia, which was a settled colony. In
Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia,2 58 the Canadian Supreme Court accepted that Indian title existed in British Columbia independently of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 or other statutory provision. 25" The court was divided evenly, however, on the question of
whether the title of the Nishga Indians had been lawfully extinguished.260 Admittedly, Justices Hall and Judson, the two leading authorities on indigenous ownership, differ significantly in their interpreta-

250. Id. at 198.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 209-42.
253. Id. at 244 (emphasis original).
254, Id.
255. Id. at 245.
256. Id. at 244. In addition to his emphasis on "English law, as applied to a settled
colony," Justice Blackburn did not consider himself bound by In re Southern Rhodesia,
[1919] A.C. 211, because Australia was not a conquered or ceded colony. Milirrpum, 17
F.L.R. at 253, Blackburn also questioned the application of those principles to a settled
colony by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, id., although he relied on Calder as authority for communal native title in
a settled colony. Id. at 223.
257. Hookey, supra note 223, at 17.
258. 34 D.L.R.3d 145 (1973).
259. Id. at 156, 190, 210-11.
260. Justices Judson. Martland, and Ritchie held that the title of the Nishga Indians
had been lawfully extinguished. Id. at 167. Justices Hall, Spence, and Laskin held that
it had not. Id. at 210-12.
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tion of Indian title.2 61 Nevertheless, in Guerin v. Regina,262 four
Canadian Supreme Court justices cited Calderwith approval as recognition of "aboriginal title as a legal right derived from the Indians' historic
occupation and possession of their tribal lands. 26 3 Of the remaining four
judges in Guerin, one took the existence of the Indian group's interest in
the land on its face, 264 while three judges supported the existence of Indian title266 independent of statutory recognition.26 6

261. According to Justice Judson:
Although I think that it is clear that Indian title in British Columbia cannot owe
its origin to the Proclamation of 1763, the fact is that when the settlers came, the
Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries. This is what Indian title means and it does not help
. . .to call it a "personal or usufructuary right." What they are asserting in this
action is that they had a right to continue to live on their lands as their forefathers
had lived and that this right has never been lawfully extinguished. There can be
no question that this right was "dependent on the goodwill of the Sovereign."
Id. at 156. Justice Judson later refers to "any right of occupancy which the Nishga
Tribe might have had .

. . ."

Id. at 167.

This approach contrasts with that of Justice Hall:
[P]ossession is of itself proof of ownership. Primafacie,therefore, the Nishgas are
the owners of the lands that have been in their possession from time immemorial
and, therefore the burden of establishing that their right has been extinguished
rests squarely on the respondent.
While the Nishga claim has not heretofore been litigated, there is a wealth of
jurisprudence affirming common law recognition of aboriginal rights to possession
and enjoyment of lands of aborigines precisely analogous to the Nishga situation
here.
Id. at 190. Justice Hall also considered that "aboriginal Indian title does not depend on
treaty, executive order or legislative enactment," id. at 200, and that "[o]nce aboriginal
title is established, it is presumed to continue until the contrary is proven." Id. at 208.
262. 13 D.L.R.4th 321 (1984).
263. Id. at 335.
264. "The nature of the interests of the Indian band, the federal Crown and the
Crown in the right of the province has been long ago settled . . ." Id. at 346 (Estey, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
265. Justice Wilson explained the existence of Indian title:
I think it is the acknowledgment of a historic reality, namely, that Indian bands
have a beneficial interest in their reserves and that the Crown has a responsibility
to protect that interest and make sure that any purpose to which reserve land is
put will not interfere with it. This is not to say that the Crown ...holds the land
in trust for the bands. The bands do not have the fee in the lands; their interest is
a limited one. But it is an interest which cannot be derogated from or interfered
with by the Crown's utilization of the land for purposes incompatible with the
Indian title unless, of course, the Indians agree.
Id. at 356-57 (Wilson, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Although Milirrpum was not appealed, a subsequent case raising similar issues is now before the High Court. In Mabo v. Queensland, a
group of Murray Islanders seek judicial recognition of their customary
title to their islands, waters, seabed, and reefs.26 7 The principal action
has yet to be decided,26 but necessarily will involve a re-examination of
Blackburn's conclusions in Milirrpum. There is a reasonable chance that
Justice Blackburn may be overruled on the question of Aboriginal title
at common law. His judgment in Milirrpum has been the subject of
academic and judicial criticism.26 " In Calder,27 Justice Hall criticized
Justice Blackburn's "acceptance of the proposition that after conquest or
discovery the native peoples have no rights at all except those subsequently granted or recognized by the conqueror or discoverer," a proposition that he consi dered "wholly wrong" upon review of a long line of
authority.2 71 These authorities, however, are subject to multiple interpretations, as a comparison of Milirrpum and Calder clearly demonstrates. 2 72 In addition, given Australia's unique historical background,

266. "Indian title has an existence apart altogether from s. 18(1) of the Indian Act."
Id. at 359 (Wilson, J., concurring in the judgment).
267, Mabo v. Queensland, 63 A.L.J.R. 84, 85 (1988).
268. The judgment in Mabo concerned the validity of the Queensland Coast Islands
Declaratory Act 1985, which purported to retrospectively extinguish any indigenous title
to the islands. A majority of the court held that the Act conflicted with § 10 of the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 and could not serve to block the principal action in the case.
269. See, e.g., Hookey, The Gove Land Rights Case: A JudicialDispensationfor the
Taking of Aboriginal Lands in Australia?, 5 FED. L. REv. 85 (1972).
270. Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, 34 D.L.R.3d 145 (1973).
271. Id. at 218. The authorities reviewed by Justice Hall include: St. Catharines
Milling & Lumber Co. v. Regina, 13 S.C.R. 577 (1887); Regina v. White & Bob, 50
D.L.R.2d 613 (1964); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 6 (Pet.) 515 (1832); United States
v. Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946); In re Southern Rhodesia, 1919 A.C. 211; Cramer v.
United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S.
339 (1941); Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487 (1967); Regina v.
Sikyea, 43 D.L.R.2d 150 (1964); Tijani v. Southern Nigeria, 2 A.C. 399 (1921); Oyekan
v. Adele, 2 All E.R. 785 (1957); Regina v. Symonds, 1847 N.Z.P.C.C. 387.
272. This difference also is found in the judgments in St. Catharines Milling &
Lumber Co. v. Regina, 13 S.C.R. 577 (1887). Justice Strong wrote:
[I]n the United States a traditional policy, derived from colonial times, relative to
the Indians and their lands has ripened into well established rules of law, and that
the result is that the lands in the possession of the Indians are, until surrendered,
treated as their rightful though inalienable property, so far as the possession and
enjoyment are concerned .... Therefore, when we consider that with reference to
Canada the uniform practice has always been to recognize the Indian title as one
which could only be dealt with by surrender to the crown, I maintain that if there
had been an entire absence of any written legislative act ordaining this rule as an
express positive law, we ought, just as the United States courts have done, to hold
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some Australian judges might hesitate to accept into Australian common
law a doctrine of communal native title which, while originating in British colonial practice, was most fully developed by North American
courts.
C.

Conquest, Customary Law, and Land Rights

It has been argued that the Aborigines might be better off if Australia
were regarded as a conquered rather than a settled colony.173 If Australia were regarded as conquered, it would mean the original acquisition
of Australia by Britain was unlawful, or it would force the courts to
recognize Aboriginal customary law in general, and Aboriginal laws of
land ownership in particular.2 4 The complaint filed in Coe v. Australia
sought to argue both propositions.2 7 The proposition, however, that
Britain acquired Australia unlawfully by conquest does not help the Aborigines' cause. In Coe, the High Court ruled unanimously that a municipal court cannot hear a challenge to Australia's sovereignty. 6 Even if a
municipal court could hear such a challenge and determined that Australia had been acquired by conquest, such a determination would not make
the acquisition illegal. While conquest no longer is considered an acceptable means of acquiring new territory, 77 even if it was clearly illegal
that it nevertheless existed as a rule of the unwritten common law ....
Id. at 612-13 (Strong, J.). Justice Taschereau reasoned that "[tihe Indians must in the
future ... be treated with the same consideration for their just claims and demands that
they have received in the past, but, as in the past, it will not be because of any legal
obligation to do so, but as a sacred political obligation, in the execution of which the state
must be free from judicial control." Id. at 649 (Taschereau, J.).
273. Hookey, supra note 223, at 16.
274. Id.
275. Coe v. Australia, 24 A.L.R. 118, 121-23 (Austl. 1979).
276. Id. at 118-19.
277. According to Greig:
Whereas under traditional international law a cession imposed by force would be
valid, the development of the twentieth century concept of the illegality of aggressive war would seem to cast doubts on the possibility that such a rule has survived.
Whatever might have been the position before the Covenant of the League [of
Nations] became operative with the signing of the Peace Treaties in 1919-20, the
various war crimes tribunals were convinced that Article 10 of the Covenant, together with the undertaking to renounce war as an instrument of national policy
in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and a series of bilateral and multilateral arrangements
tending in the same direction, had made annexation in the course of a war of
aggression ineffective as a means of transferring title.
D. GREIG, supra note 1, at 160. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides that all "Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
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under current international law,2"" the original acquisition of Australia
would not be unlawful. It is a fundamental rule of international law that
past actions must be judged according to the law as it stood at the relevant time,2"' and there is no doubt that conquest was perfectly lawful
when Great Britain acquired Australia.2 s0
The method by which Britain acquired sovereignty, rather than the
actual acquisition itself, might be a more effective challenge in an Australian court.2 8' If Australia were to be regarded as a conquered colony,

the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . . ." U.N. CHARTER, art.
2, para. 4. Article 1 of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations (Annex to UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV) of Oct. 24, 1970) specifies that "[t]he territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State
resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the
threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal."
278. This proposition is debatable. As noted by Greig, there is a definite trend towards outlawing conquest as a means of acquiring territory, but it is not clear whether
this has become a generally accepted norm of customary international law. Examples
such as Israel's continued retention of the West Bank and the Gaza strip, and the IranIraq war suggest that state practice has not yet fallen into line with UN pronouncements
on the illegal use of force against the territorial integrity of other states. On the other
hand, the world community's response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait may signal the final
demise of conquest as a tacitly accepted fact of international life.
279. In the Island of Palmas case, Arbitrator Huber noted that "a juridical fact
must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in
force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled." Island of
Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 831, 845 (1928).
280. A century later, international law texts discuss conquest as a legal (if regrettable) activity of nation states. For example, according to Woolsey, "international law acknowledges the fact of conquest after it has become a permanent fact in the world's
history, and in some degree, the right also." T. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (5th ed. 1879). Similarly, a straightforward discussion of the passage of title to conquered territory is set forth in 2 HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW OR RULES REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND

WAR 480-83 (1878). In his discussion of the period from 1815 to 1914, Brownlie notes
that:
Apart from the functioning of the public law of Europe ...the right of states to
go to war and to obtain territory by right of conquest was unlimited although
some qualifications to this position had appeared by 1914. Situations resulting
from resort to force were regarded as legally valid as in the case of the Prussian
annexation of the Danish duchies and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by the
German Empire.
I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 20 (1963).
281. In Coe v. Australia, 24 A.L.R. 118 (Austl. 1979), Justices Murphy and Jacobs
argued that this aspect of the issue could be argued in the High Court, id. at 137, 138,
although Justices Gibbs and Aickin disagreed. Id. at 128.
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a case could be made for the continuing effectiveness of Aboriginal customary laws, including those relating to the ownership of land, on the
grounds that neither British nor Australian authorities have replaced
them with the common law. On the other hand, one could argue that
European settlement and the continuous application of the common law
for two hundred years really has effectively replaced Aboriginal customary law as a matter of government policy.2" 2 Therefore, the reinstatement of Aboriginal customary law would require specific legislation.
Even if Aboriginal customary laws were still in force in Australia,
their application presumably would be restricted to the Aboriginal community or areas under Aboriginal control, as is the case today with tribal
jurisdiction in the United States.2"' Although such recognition would be
an important gain for the Aborigines,2" 4 it would not necessarily help
their case for land rights. History documents the conquerors' intent to
dispossess the Aborigines and extinguish their title to land.2" 5 Additionally, the recognition of original Aboriginal title in the United States and
Canada does not depend in any way on surviving indigenous laws. Nevertheless, the conquest theory is helpful in recognizing that conquest
alone did not disturb the existing rights of private owners: some further
action by the Crown was required. The Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council developed this theory in In re Southern Rhodesia,"" and fur-

282. As the Southern Rhodesia court explained:
According to the argument the natives before 1893 were owners of the whole of
these vast regions in such a sense that, without their permission or that of their
King and trustee, no traveller, still less a settler, could so much as enter without
committing a trespass. If so, the maintenance of their rights was fatally inconsistent with white settlement of the country, and yet white settlement was the object
of the whole forward movement, pioneered by the Company and controlled by the
Crown, and that object was successfully accomplished, with the result that the
aboriginal system gave place to another prescribed by the Order in Council.
In Re Southern Rhodesia 1919 A.C. 211, 234.
283. Mason, supra note 63, at 459-60.
284. Recognition of Aboriginal customary law is an important issue for the Aboriginal community. The Barunga Statement calls for "[a] police and justice system which
recognizes our customary laws . . . ." See infra text accompanying note 304.
285. Hookey, supra note 223, at 13-14.
286. The Committee wrote:
In any case it was necessary that the argument should go the length of showing
that the rights, whatever they exactly were, belonged to the category of rights of
private property, such that upon a conquest it is to be presumed, in the absence of
express confiscation or of subsequent expropriatory legislation, that the conqueror
has respected them and forborne to diminish or modify them.
1919 A.C. at 233.
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ther reiterated it in Tijani v. Southern Nigeria:28 7 "A mere change of
sovereignty is not to be presumed to disturb the rights of private owners.")288 Although Justice Blackburn would have considered himself
bound by In Re Southern Rhodesia if Australia had been a conquered
or ceded colony,28 9 the case is questionable precedent for the Aborigines.
If the native rights claimed
were not in the nature of private rights, they were at the disposal of the
Crown when Lobengula fled and his dominions were conquered; if they
were, any actual disposition of them by the Crown upon a conquest...
would suffice to extinguish them as manifesting an intention expressly to
exercise the right to do so.2

Under this analysis, everything hinges on the nature of the rights
claimed. In theory, nothing prevents the recognition of communal native
title as a right of private property.29 1 While the concept of communal
land ownership recognized in Tijani is similar to Aboriginal beliefs,
there is no guarantee that an Australian court would accept the analogy.
In Milirrpum, Blackburn concluded that the Aboriginal clans' undoubted interest in the lands at issue was not a proprietary interest recognizable under Australian law.292 Blackburn reached this result despite
his awareness that, in Tijani,293 the Privy Council clearly had recognized the existence of indigenous concepts of land ownership that did not
fit comfortably within the matrix of British common law.28 4 Interest-

287. 2 A.C. 399 (1921).
288.

Id. at 407.

289. Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty Ltd., 17 F.L.R. 141, 253 (1970).
290. In re Southern Rhodesia, 1919 A.C. at 234.
291. For example, in Tijani, the Privy Council pointed out the native title at issue
was
prima facie based, not on such individual ownership as English law has made
familiar, but on a communal usufructuary occupation .... The original native
right was a communal right, and it must be presumed to have continued to exist
unless the contrary is established by the context or circumstances.
2 A.C. 399, 409-10 (1921).
292. Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd., 17 F.L.R. 141, 272-74 (1971).
293. 2 A.C. 399 (1921).
294. In Tijani, the Privy Council urged a cautious approach:
[In interpreting the native title to land, not only in Southern Nigeria, but other
parts of the British Empire, much caution is essential. There is a tendency, operating at times unconsciously, to render that title conceptually in terms which are
appropriate only to systems which have grown up under English law. But this
tendency has to be held in check closely .... The title, such as it is ... may be
that of a community. Such a community may have the possessory title to the common enjoyment of a usufruct, with customs under which its individual members
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ingly, in Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia," 5 Justice
Hall commented that "the trial Judge's consideration of the real issue
was inhibited by a preoccupation with the traditional indicia of ownership. In so doing, he failed to appreciate what Lord Haldane said in
Amodu Tijani ... ."9" Although Blackburn attempted to consider the
content of the ownership concept rather than the traditional indicia, his
conclusion was influenced strongly by Anglo-Australian property
2 97
concepts.
Thus, while a judicial determination that Australia had been conquered rather than settled could be helpful to the Aborigines, there is no
guarantee that it would produce the desired practical results. It would
acknowledge formally, however, the Aborigines' persistent resistance to
European efforts to dispossess them of their lands, and counter the insulting implications of the terra nullius theory.
D.

The Treaty Concept

The Aborigines' current situation is profoundly unsatisfactory, and the
prospect of judicial remedy is uncertain. Aborigines can continue lobbying for legislative remedies, as they have for some years now. Yet, however widespread and well-intentioned the consultative process, Aborigines cannot hope to influence the content of government legislation as
they could with a negotiated agreement. The Aborigines also cannot prevent future legislative amendments that might weaken the guarantees
they have managed to secure, which already has happened with land
rights legislation. According to recent media reports, some Aboriginal
groups believe that a similar result will follow in relation to the protection of Aboriginal sacred sites in the Northern Territory. Further, the
history of Australian Aboriginal policies inspires little confidence that
governments, however well-meaning, are best able to judge the Aborigines' needs. The idea of a solemn and binding negotiated agreement, not
subject to unilateral modification or future governmental interference, is
an understandably attractive alternative.

are admitted to enjoyment, and even to a right of transmitting the individual enjoyment as members by assignment inter vivos or by succession. To ascertain how
far this latter development of right has progressed involves the study of the history
of the particular community and its usages in each case. Abstract principles fashioned a priori are of but little assistance, and are as often as not misleading.
Id. at 402-04. (Blackburn cited this passage in Milirrpum, 17 F.L.R. at 264-65.)
295. 34 D.L.R.3d 145 (1973).
296. Id. at 187.
297. 17 F.L.R. 141, 272-73 (1971).
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The idea of such a treaty is not new. In April 1979, the National
Aboriginal Conference (NAC) resolved to "request that a Treaty of
Commitment be executed between the Aboriginal nation and the Australian Government."2 8 In the same year, a group of concerned non-Aboriginal Australians formed the Aboriginal Treaty Committee to canvass
support for the treaty concept among the non-Aboriginal community.2 99
The Australian Government indicated its willingness, in principle, to examine the concept, although it expressed concern about some aspects of
the proposal."'
In October 1981, the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional
and Legal Affairs was asked to examine the feasibility of "securing a
compact or Makarrata between the Commonwealth Government and
Aboriginal Australians." 3 0 ' The Committee's report, published in 1983,

recommended that "the preferred method of legal implementation of a
compact" would be a constitutional amendment to "confer a broad
power on the Commonwealth to enter into a compact with representatives of the Aboriginal people." 302 The Committee was concerned only
with appropriate legal methods of implementing such a proposal as there
was no government decision to actually enter into negotiations with the
Aboriginal community.
The matter remained unaddressed until 1988. Following the election
of the Hawke Labor Government in 1983, which "revived hopes of national land rights legislation involving Aboriginal control of mining, ina303
lienable freehold title, protection of sacred sites and compensation,1
the treaty concept receded into the background until Australia's bicentennial year. On June 12, 1988, Australian Prime Minister Hawke met
with representatives of the National Coalition of Aboriginal Organizations at the Barunga Festival in the Northern Territory. The National
Coalition presented the Prime Minister with a statement of Aboriginal
demands known as the Barunga Statement,3" 4 and Hawke agreed "that
there shall be a treaty negotiated between the Aboriginal people and the
Government on behalf of all the people of Australia."30 5

298.
in Two
299.
300.
301.

302.
303.
at 1.
304.
305.

National Aboriginal Conference, The Makarrata Report (July 1980), quoted
Hundred Years Later, supra note 119, at 14.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 1.

Id. at xii.
Baker, Introduction, in A

TREATY WITH THE ABORIGINES?,

supra note 233,

Reprinted in id. at 47.
Transcript of the Prime Minister's Speech at Barunga Sports and Cultural Fes-
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Such an agreement will have to go beyond the traditional focus of
treaties with indigenous peoples if it is to be successful. The Barunga
Statement (Statement) summarizes key Aboriginal claims: self-determination, self-management, permanent control and enjoyment of ancestral
lands, compensation for the loss of land, protection and control of access
to sacred sites and sacred objects, respect for and promotion of Aboriginal identity, and basic human rights as guaranteed under general human
rights instruments. To this end, the Statement called for the Commonwealth Parliament to address these claims with legislation."0 6 All of these
claims could be met through appropriate legislation, as requested in the
Statement itself, but the Aboriginal representatives at Barunga presumably were intent on developing a treaty. There is nothing to suggest, however, that the "treaty" 07 is intended to be anything but a domestic instrument. Indeed, the Prime Minister has since made it clear that "[t]he
treaty will be negotiated by people who share the one nation and the one
future-it will be a treaty between Australians and for Australians."3 8
Undoubtedly, the proposed agreement will be of great interest to those
concerned with indigenous rights in general, and the UN Working
Group in particular. It would be the first modern agreement of its type,
other than settlements dealing with the land claims of particular indigenous tribes or groups. The agreement also would be the first concluded
between a government and all the indigenous groups in its territory.308 9
The agreement shares its purpose with the UN Working Group's treaty
study: to further "the effective protection and promotion of indigenous
rights through ensuring a solid, durable and equitable basis for current

tival, Northern Territory (June 12, 1988) [hereinafter Prime Minister's Speech].
306. See supra note 303 and accompanying text. Specifically, the statement demanded that the Commonwealth Parliament legislate:
- a national elected Aboriginal and Islander organization to oversee Aboriginal
and Islander affairs;
- a national system of land rights;
- a police and justice system which recognizes our customary laws and frees us

from discrimination and any activity which may threaten our identity or security,
interfere with our freedom of expression or association, or otherwise prevent our

full enjoyment and exercise of universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms.
See supra text accompanying note 304.
307.

See Prime Minister's Speech, supra note 305.

308.

Hawke, A Time for Reconciliation, in A TREATY

WITH THE ABORIGINES?

4, 5

(K. Baker ed. 1988).
309. The North American treaties and agreements were concluded with individual
tribes, or with groups of tribes in a given region, and in New Zealand the Treaty of
Waitangi never applied to the South Island.
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and future relations between indigenous populations and States."3 10 The
UN Working Group and indigenous organizations outside Australia
most likely will monitor Australia's progress towards an agreement in
Australia. Thus, a retreat from this commitment by the Australian Government would assure the Aboriginal groups of a sympathetic hearing.
E.

An InternationalInstrument?

The Fraser Liberal Government, the previous administration, was
wary of the term "treaty." Its response to the NAC proposal explained
that the Government could not "legitimately negotiate anything which
might be regarded as a 'treaty,' implying as it does an internationally
recognized agreement between two nations." 3 1 ' On the contrary, any

such agreement "must reflect the special place of Aborigifial and Torres
Strait Island people within Australia as part of one Australian nation.

'3 12

In deference to this view, the NAC called the proposed agree-

ment the "Makarrata."3 1 3 Despite this label, Prime Minister Hawke has
agreed specifically to negotiate a treaty. In his Barunga speech, however,
Hawke left the formal title of the agreement open: "[T]reaty, compact-call it as we will decide. ' "14 At the sixth session of the UN Working Group in August 1988, the Australian Observer Delegation notified
the Working Group of "the Government's commitment to the negotiation
and resolution of a Treaty between the Australian Government and the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islands People."' 1 But in his speech to the
United Nations General Assembly on October 4, 1988, the Australian
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Evans, announced:
"[W]e are seeking to complete a compact or agreement with our Aboriginal people and Islanders," though since that speech, the latest term introduced into the debate is "instrument of reconciliation." 3 16 Clearly,
310. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
311. Id.
312. Letter from the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs to the NAC, Mar. 3, 1981,
reprinted in Two Hundred Years Later, supra note 119, at 17.
313. "Makarrata"is a Yirrkala word meaning "coming together after a struggle."
Two Hundred Years Later, supra note 119, at 3.
314. Prime Minister's Speech, supra note 305.
315. UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations. Sixth Session, Geneva, Aug. 5,
1988. Statement by Mr. R. Winroe on behalf of the Australian Observer Delegation
under Item 6, Outline of a Study on the Significance of Treaties, Agreements and Other
Constructive Arrangements.
316. Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade News Release No. M162, Oct. 5,1988,
at 7. Senator Evans was a member of the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional
and Legal Affairs at the time of the Makarrata inquiry, which concluded that past trea-
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however, the Australian Government has committed itself to negotiating
some kind of instrument with Australian Aborigines and Torres Strait
Islanders, and has publicized that commitment in relevant international
fora.
At the same time, the treaty concept has been the focus of much acrimonious debate within Australia, and so far the broad political support
needed to make it a reality seems to be lacking. The Australian government, however, remains strongly committed to a process of reconciliation
with Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders, and continues to regard an
agreement or document as a desirable outcome of that process. 11
Although the Government has not suggested plans to negotiate anything more than a purely domestic instrument, some individuals and
groups would like to go much further. One authority, for example, argues for recognition of a separate Aboriginal state. 18 Another commentator regards the Makarrata concept as a "sell-out," ' and wants a
"Sovereign Treaty" that would "enshrine and protect our rights forever,

ties were inappropriate precedents for an agreement between Aborigines and the Commonwealth. See Two Hundred Years Later, supra note 119, at 58. See also Statement
by the Honorable Robert Tickner, MP, Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, on behalf of the
Australian Government to the Eighth Session of the UN Working Group on Indigenous
Populations. July 30, 1990, at 6 [hereinafter Tickner Statement] ("The Prime Minister
has referred to the document as an Instrument of Reconciliation.").
317. Tickner claimed, "My strongly held view is that attention must be focussed at
this time not on the name of some document (which is an option at the end of an extensive reconciliation process) but instead we ought to focus on the process itself as the
process is as important as the final outcome." Tickner Statement, supra note 316, at 6.
318. In his view:
Aboriginal people ought not to sell ourselves short by perceiving ourselves in
terms of a unit of Australian society-an ethnic [group] or minority-who are just
getting a hard time. We are in fact a nation of people and we ought to stand up
and acknowledge it. If this is the case, then any agreement between Aborigines
and Australia takes on a different status. It is not a status capable of being unilaterally enforced or not enforced by a white government as has been the case in New
Zealand and the United States. It means it comes under the purview of international law.
Now I can change from using the word 'agreement' to using the word 'treaty'.
The essential difference is that a treaty is an acknowledgement that there are
two states, two entities in international law, and not one state-Australia-dealing
with citizens of its own country. In that context, John Howard was right when he
said you can't have a treaty between citizens; you can't.
Mansell, Treaty Proposal Aboriginal Sovereignty, 2 ABORIGINAL L. BULL. 4, 5 (1989).
319. K. GILBERT, ABORIGINAL SOVEREIGNTY, JUSTICE, THE LAW AND LAND 23-

24 (1988).
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under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties." 320 This view
rises from the premise that an Aboriginal nation with rights derived
from international law already exists. 21
On the other hand, the argument for a separate Aboriginal state holds
that the Aboriginal community currently does not meet the traditional
criteria for statehood,32 2 although this is not an insurmountable obstacle
to recognition of an Aboriginal state.2 3 Both commentators, however,
demand an international treaty. Two key concerns are central to this
demand: the recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty and guarantees that
the Commonwealth Government cannot unilaterally modify or repudiate
the treaty. As discussed above, existing treaties with indigenous peoples
are not international instruments 324 in that they do not recognize continuing indigenous sovereignty in the sense of independent statehood. 25
Furthermore, these treaties are vulnerable to unilateral modification or
abrogation by the central governnient.32 6
It is unlikely any national government could recognize the continuing
sovereignty of its indigenous people. Even recognition of a prior sovereignty that is now extinguished would be difficult, because it could raise

320. This commentator demands that:
[aIll Rights and Principles of any Treaty we may so enter are to be:
(a) retroactive to our original position of Sovereignty, prior to invasion by the

British Crown
(b) to allow of no amendment

or

voiding or termination.

No other party but the fully Accredited Sovereign Representatives of the Aboriginal Nation shall enter into negotiation purported to be a Treaty. They shall
be the representatives chosen directly by the Aboriginal community groups and
shall in no manner be selected by agents of the coloniser.

Id. at 51.
321. Id. at 48-49.
322. The traditional criteria for statehood include a defined territory, a permanent
population, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. D.

GREIG, supra note 1, at 94-98. "The two problems I do see are in relation to government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states." Mansell, supra note 318,

at 5.
323. Mansell points to the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara and notes
that some African governments recognized Biafra as a state as potentially helpful precedents. Bangladesh might have been a better example of the case for constitutive recognition. Mansell, supra note 318, at 6.
324. See supra Part III.B.
325. The American doctrine of tribal sovereignty does recognize a degree of limited
Indian sovereignty within the United States. McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty: Accommodating Tribal, State, and Federal Interests, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 357, 359 (1978).

326. See supra text accompanying notes 165-91.
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the question of whether the extinguishment was legitimate. This question of legitimacy would not necessarily be resolved in favor of the Aborigines. Two hundred years of uninterrupted exercise of authority by
Britain and its successor, Australia, unchallenged by any other state recognized under international law, would likely have cured any defect in
the original acquisition. In other words, if Australia were not acquired
by settlement or conquest, it may have been acquired validly by prescription. As discussed above,32 the international legal rules governing the
acquisition of additional territory were developed by states and are operative as between states. The indigenous peoples involved were incidental
factors to be dealt with by the acquiring state on whatever basis it could
devise under the circumstances. Only states can challenge the acquisition
of territory through prescription, and indigenous peoples are not states
under current international law.
A more productive course of action might be to seek recognition of
prior occupancy or ownership, its consequences for land rights, and the
acceptance of a corresponding obligation to compensate Aborigines for
the loss of those lands. The original preamble to the ATSIC legislation
suggests that the Hawke Labor Government is prepared to move in this
direction. 328 It is not clear, however, if there is sufficient community and
bipartisan support at all levels of government for the Hawke Government to pursue this intention. Without such support, it may be impossible to conclude a treaty of lasting value. Moreover, one problem that has
not been discussed in recent years and needs to be addressed is that of
giving the Aboriginal and Islander communities credible assurances that
any agreement is truly binding, and not subject to unilateral abrogation
or modification in the future.
F. A Domestic Treaty?
Not all agreements between entities with international legal personality are treaties. Some agreements are governed by municipal law, "either
by express provision or by implication from the nature of the transaction," 29 and are not considered treaties. The intent of the parties determines whether an agreement will be governed by international law. But
even if the Australian Government clearly intended that the proposed
agreement be governed by international law rather than by domestic law,
it would not necessarily be a treaty in the international legal sense, as

327.
328.
329.

See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
See supra text accompanying notes 232-35.
D. GREIG, supra note 1, at 459.
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not all agreements governed by international law are treaties. 33 0 An international treaty also must contain an agreement between entities with
the necessary international legal personality and treaty-making capacity.
Under current international law, no indigenous peoples have such international legal personality or treaty-making capacity in their own
right. 3 '

Therefore, the terminology applied to the proposed agreement with
the Aborigines and the Islanders is a problem. "Compact" and "agreement" are vague terms that do not have the same symbolic value as a
"treaty," which conveys the idea of a solemn and binding agreement not
easily broken or abrogated. The "Makarrata" suggestion is not ideal in
that the word refers to the celebration marking the end of a conflict
rather than to the agreement itself.3

32

In addition, the term is meaning-

less to non-Yirrkala Aborigines. 3 3
While an Aboriginal treaty could not be recognized as a true international treaty under current international law, some Aborigines and other
interested groups would interpret it as an acknowledgment that Aboriginal Australia is some sort of entity in its own right.3 3 4 Even without such
an intention, the conclusion of a treaty might be interpreted in that
sense. The 1979 Government reaction to the terms "treaty" and "Aboriginal nation" implies a fear that the interpretation of a treaty as recognizing the Aborigines as a separate sovereign state might be a real
possibility. Some parties cling to that interpretation, either to discredit
the concept entirely, 335 or to carry it further than the Government or,
quite probably, the majority of Aborigines and Islanders wish. 6
To avoid the problems that would arise if an Aboriginal treaty were
interpreted as recognizing an Aboriginal state, the Australian Government almost certainly must make it clear that the Aborigines were not

330.

The Arbitrator in SapphireInt'l Petroleums Ltd. v. NationalIranian Oil Co.

concluded that the contract between the parties was governed by international law. 35
I.L.R. 136, 173-74 (1963).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
332. The Yirrkala community told the Senate Committee that "makarrata" was the
wrong word, and that the appropriate term was "garma." Two Hundred Years Later,
supra note 119, at 22.
333. Id.
334. "If the basic objective is to recognise Aborigines as a separate Sovereign nation
exercising powers derived from its occupation of Australia since time immemorial and
not from any legislative Act of the colonisers, then an international treaty is appropriate." Keon-Cohen, supra note 217, at 7-8. See also notes 318-19. 335. Howard, Treaty is a Recipefor Separatism, in A TREATY WITH THE ABORIGINES? 6, 6 (K. Baker ed. 1988).
336. Mansell, supra note 318, at 4; see also K. GILBERT, supra note 319, at 30-31.
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being treated as if they were a separate state or even a separate community. 337 It also is becoming less and less likely that the term "treaty" will
be used. The currently, preferred term is "instrument of reconciliation.

'3 38

Such an approach could avoid the separatist implications that

otherwise might be inferred from the proposed agreement, but it would
not solve the problem of providing the symbolic and binding character
normally attributed to treaties.
V.

POSSIBLE NEW APPROACHES

Existing general human rights instruments are not tailored to the particular needs and aspirations of indigenous peoples, and therefore do not
address some of their key concerns. The essentially individualist approach of these instruments also does not comport with what traditionally are group claims. The efforts of the UN Working Group to develop
international standards in the field of indigenous rights reflect the need
for new approaches to the problem. The Working Group must be careful, however, that such issues as self-determination, and treaties in the
context of self-determination, do not obstruct its progress.
Indigenous peoples are unlikely to benefit from a declaration too radical to attract support from a large majority of states, especially those
with indigenous populations. Such a declaration most likely would not
lead to a widely ratified international convention. On the other hand, a
declaration not adequately addressing indigenous concerns likewise
would be a waste of time. This means that, in addition to the fundamental question of land rights and basic principles such as the right to survive as distinct peoples, the declaration must cover the right of indigenous peoples to control their own affairs and have an effective voice in
determining policies and programs that affect them directly. In essence,
some form of self-determination must be provided. Another problem,
given the history of dealings between indigenous peoples and states, will
be the credibility of assurances a government might be prepared to give
on indigenous rights.

337. A letter from the Attorney-General's Department to the Aboriginal Affairs Department recommends that the Australian Government include "any provisions needed to
make it clear that Aborigines were not being treated as if they were a community separate from the Australian community, and provisions to ensure that the arrangement was
not conceived as being analogous to a treaty between separate nation States." Letter from
Secretary, Attorney-General's Department to Secretary, Department of Aboriginal Affairs, July 26, 1980, quoted in Two Hundred Years Later, supra note 119, at 57.
338. See Tickner Statement, supra note 316, at 6.
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The Importance of Self-Determination

As a direct consequence of European colonial expansion, indigenous
peoples have been deprived of their independence, their land, and their
right to choose their role in the modern state. They are at the mercy of
governments that may claim to have their best interests at heart, but
have been singularly unsuccessful at promoting or protecting those interests. After centuries of "enlightened" government policies, indigenous
peoples are still among the most severely disadvantaged groups in their
states.3 3 9 As a result, indigenous people doubt that national governments
have the ability or the desire to provide a better future. Moreover, government policies traditionally have focused on assimilation, a goal that
indigenous peoples categorically reject. Indigenous peoples want to continue as distinct peoples and do not want to disappear into the general
population. 4 "
The right of self-determination has no accepted application outside the
context of decolonization," 4 ' and does not amount to a right of secession.3 42 Self-determination, to the extent it can be held to legitimize the
aspirations of any indigenous communities within existing states, is unlikely to be generally accepted by the international community. Promoting self-determination, however, could cause political problems within
the United Nations if some states that either do not have indigenous
populations or that classify such populations as national minorities, support full, external, self-determination for indigenous populations of other
states.
At least one attempt has been made in the past to use the plight 34of3
indigenous peoples to score political points in international politics.

339.

See Martinez Cobo Report, supra note 66, para. 625.

The Martinez Cobo Report was originally issued in parts as U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/476/1-6 (1981); E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Adds.1-7 (1982); and E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1983/21/Adds.1-7. It has since been re-issued as U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 &
Adds.1-4. The Library of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs in Canberra holds a
copy of the original version, which is the one cited in this Article.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
341. Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459, 459-62, 465 (1971); see
also J. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 84-102.
342. UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence
to colonial countries and peoples. Article 2 states that "All peoples have the right to selfdetermination ... .," but article 6 adds the rider that "Any attempt aimed at the partial
or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."
343. G. BENNETT, ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1978).
U.N.G.A. Resolution 275 (III), adopted in May 1949, directed ECOSOC to study the
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Such an approach is completely unhelpful to the indigenous peoples and
must be avoided if the possibility for useful progress on indigenous rights
is to continue. In particular, politicizing the debate through undue insistence on external self-determination for indigenous peoples could
threaten state support for an indigenous people's right to internal selfdetermination. As one authority notes, not all indigenous groups are demanding self-determination in its fullest, external sense: many groups
simply want greater control of their own affairs within the confines of
the state.344 For example, in the comments to the First Draft Universal
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the National Indian
Youth Council noted that,
What indigenous self-determination requires is the recognition of a duty
by States to make structural accommodations and to secure entitlements
for the indigenous peoples within their borders in order that each may
continue its unique existence according to its desires. Only in the rarest of
circumstances would the true expression of an indigenous people's self-

determination require the dismemberment of a State willing to realize
these goals.345
The problem is "[s]elf-determination does imply the right, although
not the necessity, of independent statehood, and governments tend to
equate all demands for self-determination with independence and secession."31 4 6 The concept of self-determination often provokes an immediate

situation of indigenous populations on the American continent. According to Bennett, the
debate became politicized, with the Eastern Bloc attacking the West. In the end the

United States managed to block the proposal.
344. The authority describes this desire as follows:
The ultimate political status sought by indigenous groups through self-determination varies tremendously, reflecting the diversity of situations in which indigenous
peoples find themselves and the diverse character of the indigenous groups themselves. Some groups aspire to complete independence and statehood, while others
demand autonomy or self-government only in specific areas, such as full control

over land and natural resources. A statement prepared by indigenous groups prior
to the 1987 session of the Working Group emphasizes that freedom of choice is the

"most fundamental element of the right to self-determination" and recognizes that
indigenous self-determination "may be realized in many ways ranging from the
choice of full independence to various forms of autonomy, self-government and
participation in the political processes of the state."
Hannum, supra note 39, at 671-72 (footnote omifted).
345. DiscriminationAgainst Indigenous Peoples. Analytical compilation of observations and comments received pursuant to Sub-Commission resolution 1988118. U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/33/Add.1, 14, para. 5 [hereinafter Discrimination Against
Indigenous Peoples].

346.

Hannum, supra note 39, at 672. The Martinez Cobo Report notes that "f[in
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negative reaction that stems from self-determination's linkage with the
creation of new states through decolonization 347 or secession, 8" and because some indigenous groups equate self-determination with full independence. 4 This negative reaction overshadows the possibility of finding acceptable compromises on forms of internal self-determination that
would not threaten the unity of the state, but that would provide indigenous groups with an effective degree of control over their own destinies.
These negative connotations probably explain the reluctance of some
states to admit that they have indigenous populations,350 an attitude
which suggests that indigenous groups in Africa and parts of Asia might
not benefit directly from any future declaration or convention on indigenous rights. Unless the concept is clarified, there is a real risk that the
issue of self-determination could become a major obstacle on the path to
a meaningful declaration.3 5 ' There is a similar risk that associating treaties with an indigenous right to self-determination will inspire governments to adopt an even more restrictive attitude to treaties than in the
past.
On the other hand, self-determination is as much a key issue for indigenous peoples as land rights," 2 and must be addressed adequately in
any international instrument on indigenous rights. At the sixth session of
the UN Working Group, "[a]ccording to the overwhelming majority of
indigenous representatives, self-determination and self-government
should be amongst the fundamental principles of the draft declaration." 3 If self-determination is the ability of a given people to make

their reaction, governments often confuse any claim for autonomy and self-determination
with a demand for absolute and immediate freedom, independence and sovereignty."
Martinez Cobo Report, supra note 66, para. 148.
347. Emerson, supra note 341, at 462.
348. Bangladesh and Biafra are two examples.
349. Consider the proposal of the indigenous participants in the 1977 International
NGO Conference on Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations in the Americas.
See supra notes 108, 344.
350. See supra note 66.
351. The UN Working Group is well aware of this. At its sixth session, one member
observed that the issue of self-determination "underlies much of the discussion in the
Working Group. The concept should be demystified since in this case it did not mean
statehood or independence or any sort of secession." Report on Indigenous Populations,
supra note 98, para. 76.
352. "Indigenous observers concluded that, together with self-determination, the
rights to land and resources were fundamental to the very existence of indigenous peoples, their identity and their well-being." Id. para. 82.
353. Id. para. 80.
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meaningful choices about their future, 354 then indigenous peoples have
strong grounds for complaint.3 5 5 If self-determination is the ability to
make meaningful choices according to their own standards, the situation
is worse35 in that the assumption that institutions and approaches based
on European models are inherently superior to those of more "primitive"
peoples tends to operate at the expense of indigenous institutions. 3 " As
the Martinez Cobo Report concluded:
Respect and support for the internal organization of indigenous peoples
and their cultural expressions constitute an essential consideration for any
arrangement aimed at securing appropriate participation by indigenous
communities in all affairs which affect them. Consequently, Governments
must abandon their policies of intervening in the organization and development of indigenous peoples, and must grant them autonomy, together
with the capacity for controlling the relevant economic processes in
whatever way they themselves consider to be in keeping with their interests and needs." 8
The first revised text of the Draft Declaration reflects three primary

354. "As far as it applies to indigenous nations and peoples, the essence of this right
is the right to free choice, and therefore the indigenous peoples themselves must to a
large extent create the specific content of the principle." Martinez Cobo Report, supra

note 66, para. 276.
355. These grounds include: (1) terms on which indigenous peoples coexist with the
broader community invariably have been imposed from outside, either as a matter of
government policy or as an inevitable consequence of European colonization; (2) indigenous policy is in the hands of central governments that generally do not represent their
interests; and (3) though some governments are now disposed to consult with indigenous
peoples about policies that affect them, this does not necessarily imply effective indige-

nous input into the decision-making process. Hanks, Aborigines and Government: The
Developing Framework, in ABORIGINES AND THE LAW 19, 38-45 (P. Hanks & B.
Keon-Cohen eds. 1984).
356. The Martinez Cobo Report notes that the "de facto or de jure recognition of
the existence of indigenous communities as local or regional politico-administrative entities means little or nothing if interference in basic forms of internal organization is such
as to produce disequilibrium and destabilization in their midst." Martinez Cobo Report,
supra note 66, para. 156.

357. The Martinez Cobo Report adds:
This is one of the defects pointed out in the United States Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, which, while according recognition of important aspects of initiative
and responsibility to the indigenous communities, peoples and nations of that
country, imposed upon them, as has been mentioned, foreign ways of consulting
the will of their members and of determining when and how decisions are reached
which are binding for those members.
Id. para. 157.

358. Id. para. 268.
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elements of internal self-determination for indigenous peoples: (1) the
right to participate in the development of national indigenous policies;
(2) the right of indigenous communities to determine the structure and
character of their own institutions; and (3) the right of indigenous peoples to run their own internal aftairs.39 How these elements will be.
achieved necessarily depends on the circumstances of each case and on
the wishes of the particular indigenous community, but it should not be
unduly difficult for governments and indigenous peoples to agree on a
broad platform for internal self-determination.
Compromises, however, are needed on both sides. For example, it is
hard to imagine a state agreeing that none of its laws would be applicable to certain areas or groups, but it should be possible to work out a
balance between state and indigenous jurisdictional areas. One commentator is concerned about the willingness of indigenous communities that
have a degree of self-determination to observe general human rights
standards."' In Lovelace v. Canada,3 61 we have a good example of the
conflict between non-discrimination standards and an indigenous community's desire to control its own membership. On the other hand, the
Mikmag nation of Canada responded to these concerns by ratifying the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the Interna-

359. Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples. First revised text of the Draft
Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples prepared by the ChairmanRapporteur of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations,Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes,
pursuant to Sub-Commission resolution 1988118. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/33
of 15 June 1989, 4-8. The relevant principles are:
22. The right to participate fully at the State level, through representatives chosen
by themselves, in decision-making about and implementation of all national and
international matters which may affect their life and destiny.
23. The [collective] right to autonomy in matters relating to their own internal and
local affairs, including education, information, culture, religion, health, housing,
social welfare, traditional and other economic activities, land and resources administration and the environment, as well as internal taxation for financing these autonomous functions.
24. The right to decide upon the structures of their autonomous institutions, to
select the membership of such institutions, and to determine the membership of the
indigenous people concerned for these purposes.

With the single exception of the square brackets around the word "collective" in Principle 23, these principles are identical to the original draft. Report on Indigenous Populations, supra note 98, at 32, 35.
360. Hannum, supra note 39, at 673-74.
361. 2 Hum. Rts. L.J. 158 (1981). The case illustrates a conflict between the desire
of an indigenous community to determine its membership and general principles of nondiscrimination.
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tional Convention on Economic and Social Rights.3" 2 While this action
has not been recognized by the international community, 6 ' it indicates a
clear commitment by one indigenous group to observe international
human rights standards.
Because there currently is no authoritative definition of self-determination outside the context of decolonization, there is no impediment to
devising a specific definition of indigenous self-determination that would
be acceptable both to governments and to indigenous peoples, and which
could be incorporated into a declaration on indigenous rights. Realistically, such a definition would have to focus clearly on self-determination
within the state, or the declaration would fail to attract the requisite
degree of state support. Admittedly, such a definition would not satisfy
those indigenous groups that aspire to full external self-determination.
Nevertheless, it would be a significant advancement in the field of indigenous rights if governments acknowledged indigenous peoples as competent and entitled to manage their own affairs.
Australia supports indigenous self-determination as long as it is limited to self-determination within the confines of the state. 64 The Australian Government has experimented with mechanisms for consulting its
indigenous peoples on matters that concern them, 6 ' and it has taken
steps to ensure the close involvement of Aborigines and Islanders in developing and implementing the policies that affect them. 6
The most

362. Hannum, supra note 39, at 674 n.93.
363. Id.
364. The Australian House of Representatives resolution of August 23, 1988 affirms
that Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders are entitled to "self-management and selfdetermination subject to the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of Australia." AUSTL. H.R. DEBATES, Aug. 23, 1988, at 137.
365. These experiments include the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee,
the National Aboriginal Conference, and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission.
366. Nevertheless, Australia's current position on the relevant principles of the draft
declaration is fairly cautious. Its comments were as follows:
Principle 22
The principle is supported in the context that Aboriginal people have equal
rights with all other Australians to participate fully at the State level and elect
their parliamentary representatives.
Under the Australian Constitution, there is no special provision for political
representation of Aboriginal people. It is highly unlikely that a referendum to
allow for such provision would be successful.
Principle 23
While the Australian Government is supportive of collective rights to autonomy,
the implication of segregation in principle 23 could not be supported. As currently
formulated the provision would potentially conflict with article 1, paragraph 4,
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notable step includes the establishment of ATSIC, which replaced the
former Department of Aboriginal Affairs in 1990. The structure of the
Commission is intended to ensure "maximum participation of Aboriginal
persons and Torres Strait Islanders in the formulation and implementation of government policies that affect them.

'36 7

For example, three of

the twenty Commissioners are to be appointed by the Minister, and the
remaining seventeen are to be elected from among their number by the
members of regional councils made up of elected Aboriginal and Islander
representatives.368 Furthermore, only Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders are eligible to vote in the regional council elections36 9 or to become appointed or elected as Commissioners or regional councilors.
Some would argue that ATSIC is a white man's structure imposed on
Aborigines from the outside.3 7 At the same time, the Commission, the
regional council, and the electoral process are designed to give all Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders the option of having an input into
the policies and programs that affect them directly. This system is a major advance on past paternalistic approaches. It does, in effect, appear to
meet Aboriginal demands for "a national elected Aboriginal and Islander

and article 3 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. To avoid this conflict, the principle could be qualified by
reference to the special needs of indigenous people. This could be done by inserting the words "where indigenous peoples require protection" at the beginning
of principle 23. It would also be preferable that the collective right "only be exercisable with the full consent of the indigenous peoples and so as not to establish a
system of racial segregation."
Principle 24
In principle 24, the word "institution" needs to be clarified. If "institutions"
means indigenous community organizations, then Australia would support this
principle, as the Australian Government provides assistance to many community
organizations. However, if "institutions" means, for example, a separate political
institution, then principle 24 could not be supported.
DiscriminationAgainst Indigenous Peoples, supra note 345, at 29-30.
367. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act of 1989, No. 150, Part 1 § 3(a).
368. Id. Part 2, Div. 3, § 27; Part 3, Div. 7, § 131.
369. Id. Part 2, Div. 3, § 31(1); Part 3, Div. 4, §§ 101-102.
370. Statement delivered by Paul Coe, Chairperson of the National Aboriginal and

Islander Legal Services Secretariat, to the Eighth Session of the UN Working Group on
Indigenous Populations, July 30, 1990, at 3-4. Coe argues that the Commission was
imposed on Aboriginal people without their consent, that it does not provide for enforcement of their individual or collective rights, and that it is essentially a white bureaucratic
structure dressed up as an assembly of Aboriginal and Islander Commissioners. He also
regards the use of "white man's procedures" for selecting Commissioners, and the prescription of regional and zonal boundaries without regard for traditional boundaries as
"fundamental violations of our right to self-determination." Id. at 4.
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organization to oversee Aboriginal and Islander affairs. ' '3 7 1 The ATSIC's credibility as an organization representing Aborigines and Torres
Strait Islanders will depend directly on the willingness of its constituents
to participate in the process,, as voting in the regional council elections is
optional. Australia appears to be well placed to set an example in the
area of indigenous rights, particularly if the other key elements of indigenous self-determination are enshrined in an Aboriginal agreement or
otherwise are implemented in the reconciliation process.
B.

The Question of Meaningful Guarantees

Indigenous peoples are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their
states of nationality and have no international legal personality in their
own right. Therefore, they do not have recourse to extra-national remedies against government oppression. In negotiations, debates, or outright
disputes with a national government, indigenous peoples depend on that
government's goodwill. To the extent indigenous rights currently are recognized under domestic law, they are subject to unilateral modification
or termination by the state. Treaties often have been broken in the past
and can be overridden by domestic legislation or otherwise unilaterally
terminated by the government. Courts in the United States and Canada
have done much to uphold indigenous and treaty rights, but this is possible only in areas in which those rights have not been extinguished already by the state. Legislation guaranteeing indigenous rights can be
weakened or abolished by future governments. National legislatures presumably would not take such action without good cause, yet indigenous
land rights might not prevail against powerful interests that seek to develop traditional indigenous land or its resources. Indigenous peoples are
seriously under-represented in national legislatures,3 2 and many constitute only a small minority of the general population. A constitutional
guarantee, if possible, would offer more security, because constitutions
generally are difficult to change.
Given the history of dealings between indigenous peoples and states, it
seems only fair for governments to offer credible assurances that future
agreements or treaties will not be unilaterally modified or terminated
except in the most exceptional circumstances. Having suffered from broken promises and policy fluctuations for generations, indigenous peoples
understandably are cynical about government assurances. Hence, indige-

371. The Barunga Statement, reprinted in A TREATY WITH
supra note 233, at 47.
372. Martinez Cobo Report, supra note 66, paras. 257-61.
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nous groups insist that existing and future treaties should be subject to
the same rules as international treaties, 37 3 which, in principle, would
mean that they were not subject to unilateral modification or
termination.37 4
Requiring assurances that treaties and agreements will not be modified is a sensitive issue, because states naturally would regard such arrangements as interference in their domestic affairs. Admittedly, a wide
range of general human rights instruments have made a state's treatment
of its own nationals an issue of general international concern. While no
state enjoys being criticized for its human rights record, such criticism by
other states is the prime mechanism for ensuring that human rights are
respected by governments. International criticism serves to remind states
that their international image suffers as a result of flagrant human rights
violations and maintains pressure on the state to improve its human
rights record. Although not universally effective, it is preferable to no
mechanism at all.
The existence of a universal declaration of indigenous rights would
focus international criticism of domestic indigenous policies, and make it
harder for governments to hide behind the screen of domestic jurisdiction. Those states concerned with their human rights image would feel
morally obliged to respond more positively to the concerns of their own
indigenous communities. While this already is happening in the United
States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, a declaration certainly
would give impetus to such efforts.

373. See, e.g., The Draft Declaration of Principles for the Defence of the Indigenous
Nations and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere, proposed by the indigenous participants in the 1977 International NGO Conference on Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations in the Americas. "Treaties and other agreements entered into by indigenous
nations and groups with other States, whether denominated as treaties or otherwise, shall
be recognized and applied in the same manner and according to the same international
laws and principles as the treaties and agreements entered into by other States." Reprinted in Martinez Cobo Report, supra note 66, Annex IV, 2.
374. Accordingly, at the sixth session of the UN Working Group,
[o]ne indigenous observer noted that the resolution of treaty disputes is usually left
in the hands of the State, thus rendering the State interested party, administrator
and adjudicator should the indigenous party wish to challenge the actions of the
State. Indigenous peoples are then confronted with a State apparatus of considerable financial resources with which to pursue a prolonged series of negotiations,
litigation and other legal manoeuvres. For these reasons, indigenous observers emphasized the need for international oversight during the implementation of treaties.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 26, 39, 42(2), 54.
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C.

InternationalOversight?

Through some form of international oversight, it might be possible to
encourage governments to recognize universal indigenous rights. The
United Nations, like other international fora, is familiar both with voluntary and mandatory reporting systems. A voluntary, informal reporting system on indigenous rights already exists in the sense that participating governments provide information to the UN Working Group.
The proposed Universal Declaration could signal the desirability of coitinuing this voluntary exchange of information and encourage governments to provide information on the progress towards implementing its
principles. Compliance by concerned states would draw attention to
others who did not provide information and would be reinforced if the
declaration also provided for the continuing provision of information by
non-governmental organizations and indigenous groups. This approach
would formalize the way the UN Working Group operates and would
intensify international pressure on the subject, especially if the Working
Group conducts regular reviews of the progress toward realizing the
principles of the declaration.
However numerous, widely ratified international human rights instruments provide for mandatory reporting by the states parties.375 While
including a mandatory reporting requirement in a non-binding declaration would be inappropriate, it might be possible to effectuate a reporting requirement in the form of a protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Ideally, the proposed declaration is just the first step towards a viable
international indigenous rights convention that would include a
mandatory reporting system and mechanisms for international oversight
of compliance. That, however, is a distant goal. Meanwhile, the states
that genuinely seek to improve the status of their indigenous peoples
must set an example through imaginative approaches to indigenous policies and programs, and by providing constructive precedents for others.
D. A New Type of Instrument?
The proposed Australian treaty could become a precedent for international consensus on the rights of indigenous peoples. While it is too soon
to predict its overall character and specific content, it could become the
first of a new generation of treaties designed to ensure "a solid, durable
375. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7,
art. 40; International Covenant on Economic, and Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 8, art. 16.
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and equitable basis for current and future relations between indigenous
populations and States."3 6 Admittedly, not all states will see a comprehensive treaty or agreement as an appropriate mechanism for addressing
the concerns of their indigenous peoples. Modern approaches to settling
indigenous claims are becoming more comprehensive in scope than traditional treaties, and more sensitive to the genuine concerns of indigenous
peoples.3
This more comprehensive approach to indigenous claims is a significant step forward because traditional treaties, for all their symbolic and
practical value have fallen short of the expectations that they are guarantees of indigenous rights.3 7 8 While the problem has less to do with the
instruments themselves than the manner in which governments have implemented their treaty commitments, relying on traditional models is not
necessarily the best approach for the future. While there still is a need
for agreements concerning the settlement of specific land claims, any tendency for such agreements to look beyond the basic question of land
ownership and address issues that affect the particular community's way
of life, aspirations for the future, and capacity to handle its own affairs
should be encouraged. This might be the most practical way to handle
the claims of specific indigenous groups, so long as it is done through a
process of genuine negotiation, rather than unilateral determination by
the government.
This approach, however, is only a partial answer to the problem and
only caters to those indigenous communities that still have a land base.
Indigenous communities without a land base also have problems and
concerns that deserve attention. For example, access to education in their
traditional language and culture is of particular concern to indigenous
people who no longer occupy their traditional land. An umbrella treaty
or agreement could address issues of key concern to all indigenous communities on a national basis and lay the foundations for a more positive
relationship between indigenous peoples and the rest of the community.
This approach particularly is relevant to a country like Australia, whose
indigenous peoples are fragmented and widely dispersed. In addition to
the specific commitments enshrined in such a treaty, its very existence
would have considerable symbolic value-especially for those indigenous
communities that do not have an existing treaty with their state of nationality. A treaty would formally acknowledge their existence, their im-

376. Report on Indigenous Populations,supra note 98, para. 98.
377.

See Canada's James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, supra notes 209-16

and accompanying text.
378.

For a discussion of the practical value of treaties, see supra Part III.C.
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portance as a part of the national community, and their pride in their
own history and culture.
The Australian treaty is regarded as a test case for this type of approach. The exercise would be more meaningful, both in terms of its
primary purpose and as a constructive precedent in the field of indigenous rights, if the government took the opportunity to offer formal assurances that the treaty, as concluded, would not be unilaterally modified or
terminated at a future date.
E.

An InternationalDimension?

It might be appropriate to give an indigenous treaty an international
dimension to reinforce the instrument's solemn and binding character,
and to give the indigenous party credible assurances it will not be unilaterally modified by the government. There are several ways of accomplishing this goal without compromising the treaty's character as an intrinsically domestic instrument rather than an international treaty.
1. International Dispute Settlement?

-

It is possible for a treaty to include a provision that requires serious
disputes over the treaty be referred to some form of extra-national conciliation or arbitration mechanism if the dispute cannot be resolved domestically. For example, international arbitration clauses often are included in mineral exploitation agreements between states and foreign
companies, although such agreements clearly are contracts rather than
true international agreements. A dispute settlement provision would reassure the indigenous party that its government intended to abide by the
treaty, and that a future government could not simply ignore it.
Submitting such disputes to an impartial third party, ideally an expert
in the field, would do much to offset the unequal status and bargaining
power of the state and indigenous parties. In international arbitration,
the third party's ruling could not be enforced directly; however, the state
undoubtedly would be exposed to strong international criticism if it
failed to implement such a ruling. A state that is concerned enough
about human rights to enter into an indigenous treaty might well hesitate to subject itself to such criticism. On the other hand, even the most
well-intentioned state might be reluctant to tie its hands in this manner.
Circumstances such as a serious economic crisis might make it difficult
for a state to fully honor domestic commitments made in good faith. In
addition, an outside arbitrator might not be in a position to appreciate
fully the dimensions of the domestic problem. Although unmerited complaints by indigenous extremists could be filtered out of the process,
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there still is a very real risk that contentious arbitration decisions could
simply exacerbate tensions between the parties. Although the analogy is
far from perfect, the Minorities Treaty system in Europe is a sobering
example of the possible problems inherent in international policing of
37 9
'domestic commitments.
On balance, it is ha'd to imagine any government formally committing
itself to compulsory, binding international arbitration on the implementation of an indigenous treaty. One indicator to this effect is that less
than half the states which are parties to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) have ratified its Optional Protocol,
which involves less intimidating, non-binding procedures for examining
individuals' complaints of humans rights violations. s '
2.

Independent Conciliation?

Another possible solution is an agreement to ask that a reputable international figure use his "good offices" to help the parties reach an accommodation in the event of a serious disagreement over the implementation of the treaty. The UN Secretary-General traditionally has played
a similar role in helping mediate serious differences between states. As
far as the implementation of an indigenous treaty is concerned, the
chairperson of the UN Working Group would be the obvious person to
mediate. As the process would involve mediation and conciliation at the
request of both parties, rather than a determination of who was right,
taking on such a role would not compromise the non-judgmental character of the Working Group. A "good offices" approach, because it is more
private and less adversarial than a formal arbitration procedure, might
be more constructive in the long run.

379. Those undertakings were imposed on particular states from outside, and were
enshrined in international treaties with very limited provisions for the minorities concerned to complain directly, rather than through sympathetic states. I. CLAUDE, NATIONAL MINORITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 16-30 (1955). It is at least arguable that the system failed because of the cynical way it was used and abused by the
parties, but it undoubtedly did much to aggravate ill-feeling between both sides. Id. at
39-48.
380. As of January 1, 1988, 86 states had ratified the ICCPR, but only 39 had
ratified the Optional Protocol. The Human Rights Committee holds closed meetings to
consider complaints under the Optional Protocol, art. 5(3); it forwards its views to the
state party and individual concerned (article 5(4)); it includes a summary of its activities
under the Optional Protocol in its annual report, art. 6.

1990]
3.

GUARANTEEING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

A Binding International Commitment?

Once the treaty is concluded, the Australian Government will wish to
formally advise the UN Working Group of the treaty's conclusion. The
Government could take this opportunity to underscore the treaty's solemn and binding character, and announce that it undertook to refrain
from future modification or termination of the treaty without the consent
of its indigenous peoples. If a national emergency arose, the treaty could
be suspended for a limited time. Although the Working Group's sessions
are attended by government officials rather than by ministers, such an
announcement, if it had the Prime Minister's explicit approval, might
constitute a unilateral declaration that would bind Australia under international law. As the International Court of Justice held in the Nuclear
Tests Case:3 '
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts,
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal
obligations ....

When it is the intention of the State making the declara-

tion that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention
confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State
being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent
with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and
with an intent to be bound, even though not within the context of international negotiations, is binding." 2
If the Prime Minister or the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade
made such a statement in the United Nations General Assembly, there
would be no doubt of Australia's intent to enter into a binding international commitment to that effect. The position of the person making the
statement, the character of the statement, and the forum to which it was
made would make this clear.' 83
381. Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253.
382. Id. at 267-68.
383. The Court stated:
Of the statements by the French Government now before the Court, the most
essential are clearly those made by the President of the Republic. There can be no
doubt, in view of his functions, that his public communications or statements, oral
or written, as Head of State, are in international relations acts of the French State
.... Thus, in whatever form those statements were expressed, they must be held
to constitute an engagement of the State, having regard to their intention and the
circumstances in which they were made.
It is from the actual substance of these statements, and from the circumstances
attending their making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act must be
deduced.
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In the event of future government action to modify or terminate the
treaty without the consent of the Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders,
grounds for international action against Australia would exist. If a state
wished to take the matter to the ICJ, Australia could not object, because
it has submitted itself to the compulsory jurisdiction "of the Court. The
Court, however, might decline jurisdiction on the grounds that the state
initiating the action was not affected directly by the breach of the international commitment. When Ethiopia and Liberia, in their capacity as
former members of the League of Nations, alleged that South Africa had
contravened the Mandate for South West Africa, the ICJ found that
"the Applicants cannot be considered to have established any legal right
or interest appertaining to them in the subject-matter of the present
claims, and that, accordingly, the Court must decline to give effect to
them."" 4
On the other hand, the ICJ could give an advisory opinion on the
subject at the request of the UN General Assembly.38 5 Accordingly, such
a commitment would inspire future governments to consider the effect of
their actions before enacting legislation to modify or terminate the treaty
on a unilateral basis.
4.

A Commitment to Invite International Scrutiny?

Another possible approach might be for the Australian Government to
submit periodic reports on the implementation of the treaty to the UN
Working Group on a voluntary basis, and to invite the Working Group
to review the operation of the treaty in an advisory capacity. A willingness to submit to international scrutiny would effect an additional guarantee of the government's good faith, especially if the treaty provided for
such scrutiny.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Governments have encroached upon the basic rights of indigenous
peoples for centuries. Nevertheless, indigenous peoples are still pressing
for recognition of their rights, including self-determination and self-government. While these goals warrant attention and are beginning to be
Id. at 269.
384.

South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.) 1966 I.C.J. 4,

99.
385. Article 65(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that:
"The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of
whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations to make such a request."
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recognized by the international community, actual implementation has
been problematic. Imaginative approaches are needed if real progress is
to be made on indigenous rights.
A widely ratified Universal Declaration on indigenous rights could
contribute to the protection of indigenous rights, if it addresses key issues
such as land rights and self-determination in a manner acceptable to
both indigenous groups and national governments. Australia's recentlyestablished Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission is one example of a constructive approach to the problem area of indigenous selfdetermination. Such examples could inspire a more positive debate on
this issue in the UN Working Group and elsewhere.
The proposal for a treaty or "instrument of reconciliation" between
the Australian government and its Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
peoples gives Australia a further opportunity to make a positive contribution to the development of international standards on indigenous
rights, notably in the area of legally binding treaty guarantees. An international dimension to a domestic treaty or agreement could reinforce the
credibility and binding character of such guarantees.

